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Extradition to a State that Imposes the
Death Penalty
SHARON A. WILLIAMS*
E XTRADITION LAW MAY BE CHARACTERIZED as the com-
plex compendium of rules that assist states in seeking the
return of fugitives from their criminal justice systems. This
view of the extradition law and process is one of mutual assis-
tance in criminal matters between states. Reciprocity is the key
note with states having a mutuality of obligations.1 At the
same time extradition law performs the function of protecting
a fugitive, through legal safeguards, from being returned to
the extradited state.
This article will address the question of what Canada
should do when faced with an extradition request for a person
who is accused of, or has been convicted of, a capital offence in
the requesting state. It will be assumed that all the other
requirements of extradition are in order: for example, that the
crime is extraditable, that there is double criminality, and suf-
ficient evidence. The main focus will be on extradition based
on the Canadian Extradition Act.2 Canada does not extradite
unless there is a treaty in force with the requesting state, save
in two circumstances: first, where there is a special agreement
with a foreign state pursuant to Part II3 of this Act and, sec-
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
i This may be seen in the basic precept of extradition law that is contained in the
extradition laws and treaties of many countries, that there be the threshold require-
ment of double criminality. As to reciprocity, see M. C. Bassiouni, International
Extradition: United States Law and Practice C.7 , at 325 (1987), and International
Extradition and World Public Order 314 (1974).
2 R.S.C. 1985, c. E-2 3 . Hereinafter "Extradition Act."
3 These agreements are far more limited than extradition treaties. For example, they
apply only to crimes committed after the agreement has entered into force, whereas
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ond, where the rendition of fugitives to or from the Common-
wealth under the Fugitive Offenders Act 4 is concerned.
I. TREATY INTERPRETATION AND STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
As a preliminary step to dealing with the matter of human
rights, the death sentence, and extradition from Canada, there
are differences in approach between interpretation of Canada's
extradition treaties and its Extradition Act. These become
apparent when the role of extradition in the overall scheme of
things is considered. From a purely international perspective,
it is a treaty matter bearing on the rights and duties of states
and the emphasis is thus on interstate co-operation. From the
domestic law perspective, extradition may be viewed as part of
the criminal process and perforce be interpreted in a fashion
that stresses the fugitive's rights.
Generally speaking, the rule fundamental to the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, i969,5 is that of literal
interpretation according to the ordinary meaning of the words
used in the text. There is also the essential commitment that
treaties are to be interpreted in good faith (pacta sunt ser-
vanda) "which is at once psychological and ethical, requiring
adherence to ordinary meaning and context." 6 A treaty must
be interpreted in a manner that is calculated to give it effect
and content rather than to deprive it of meaning. 7
Applying this to extradition treaties, the approach of courts
in Canada and in the United Kingdom has been that of liberal
extradition treaties, unless they provide expressly to the contrary, are pursuant to
the Extradition Act, retrospective as well as prospective, and contain a more detailed
schedule of offences. For an example of such an express limit on retrospectivity, see
the Extradition Treaty between Canada and Israel, 1967, Can. T.S. No. 25. This type
of Part II special agreement was done for the first time with the Federal Republic of
Germany in 1974. However, the treaty entered into by both states in 1977 and in
force on September 3o, 1979 superceded this: see 1979, Can. T.S. No. 18. Note that
this treaty will likely be amended in the near future to reflect German unification.
In 1979 a Part II agreement was signed with Brazil and in 1985 with India. As of
1987 Canada has an extradition treaty with India.
4 R.S.C. 1985, c. F- 3 2. Hereinafter "Fugitive Offenders Act."
5 UN Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, May 23, 1969; reprinted in (1969) 8 Int'l Leg. Mat. 679.
Instrument of accession deposited by Canada, Oct. 14, 1970, pursuant to Order in
Council, P.C. 1979-1339. Entered into force Jan. 27, 198o.
6 See S. A. Williams and A. L. C. de Mestral, An Introduction to International Law
359 (1987, 2nd ed.).
7 Ibid. See also M. McDougall, The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public
Order 156 (1967).
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interpretation in order to give effect to the treaty. As G.V. La
Forest, now a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada, stated in
Extradition To and From Canada, "treaties should receive a
fair and liberal meaning and ... in extradition matters the
ordinary technical rules of criminal law should apply to a
limited extent."8 In Schmidt v. Her Majesty in Right of Can-
ada, the United States of America and the Attorney General of
Ontario, he went on to state that:
I would add that the lessons of history should not be overlooked. Sir
Edward Clarke instructs us that in the early g9th century the English
judges by strict and narrow interpretation, almost completely nulli-
fied the operation of the few extradition treaties then in existence: see
A Treatise Upon the Law of Extradition (4 th ed. 1903), c. V. Follow-
ing the enactment of the British Extradition Act. 1870 (U.K.) 33 8c 34
Vict., c. 52, upon which ours is modelled, this approach was
reversed. The present system of extradition works because courts give
the treaties a fair and liberal interpretation with a view to fulfilling
Canada's obligations, reducing the technicalities of criminal law to a
minimum and trusting the courts in the foreign country to give the
fugitive a fair trial .... 9
Necessarily, should a treaty provision, as implemented into
Canadian law by the Extradition Act, violate a right under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms' 0 and not be saved
by section i of the Charter, the provision will be struck down
as would domestic legislation itself.1
In the United States one writer has stated that "Where a
provision is capable of two interpretations either of which
would comport with the other terms of the treaty, the judiciary
will choose the construction which is more liberal and would
permit the relator's extradition, because the purpose of the
treaty is to faciliate extradition treaties between the parties to
the treaty."' 2 He further stated that "At times the judiciary will
8 (2nd ed., 1977), at 57.
9 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500, 524.
1o Being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, entered by the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.)
c.i i, proclaimed into force Apr. 17, 1982.
it See Schmidt, supra note 9, at 518, where La Forest, J. states that "There can be no
doubt that the actions undertaken by the Government of Canada in extradition as
in other matters are subject to scrutiny under the Charter.... " See also at pp.
521-22 with reference to Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R.
441, per Dickson, C.J. at 455 and Wilson, J. at 464.
1a M. C. Bassiouni, op. cit. supra note 1, c.2, at 88 (emphasis added), citing as to the
rule of liberal interpretation of extradition treaty terms, Brauch v. Raich, 618 F. 2d.
843 (ist Cir. 198o); U.S. v. Wiebe, 733 F. 2d. 539, 5 5 4 (8th Cir. 1984), and Matter of
Sidona, 584 F. Supp. 1437 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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interpret terms beyond their actual meaning to encompass
their spirit and intent. . . .,,i
This approach of liberal interpretation of extradition trea-
ties may be labelled "co-operative" as it responds to the
mutual interests of states in having a flexible extradition pro-
cess and reciprocal co-operation.' 4 Halsbury's Laws of Eng-
land states it in this way: "The words used in such [extradi-
tion] treaties are to be given their ordinary international
meaning, general to lawyer and layman alike, and not a par-
ticular meaning which they may have attracted in certain
branches of activity in England." 5 In the case of Government
of Belgium v. Postlewaite, 6 Lord Bridge of Harwich
addressed this issue and referred to the well known dictum of
Lord Russell, C.J. in Re Arton (No. 2) where he stated that,
"In my judgment those treaties ought to receive a liberal inter-
pretation, which means no more then that they should receive
their true construction according to their language, object and
intent." 17 Lord Bridge went on to hold that the judgment in
Arton was good authority for the proposition that the court
should not interpret any extradition treaty, unless so con-
strained by the language, in a way that would "hinder the
working and narrow the operation of most salutary interna-
tional arrangements.' 8 He also referred to Lord Widgery,
C.J.'s statement in R. v. Governor of Ashford Remand Centre,
ex p. Beese,1 9 in which he held that, because an extradition
treaty is a contract between two sovereign states, it has to be
construed as if it were a domestic statute. However, in apply-
13 Ibid., 89, referring to L. Oppenheim, International Law, vol. 1, at 952-53 (8th ed.,
1955). This rule was applied in Melia v. United States, 667 F. 2d 300 (2nd Cir.
1984).
14 See C. Warbrick "The Criminal Justice Act 1988 (1) the New Law on Extradition,"
[1989] Crim. L.R. 4, 5, note 19; and see especially the dissenting opinion of
Schemers in Bozano v. France, App. No., 999o/82, Commission Report, (1987), 9
E.H.R.R. 297, 326-27.
15 (4 th ed., 1977), vol. 18, at 88, para. 216, citing R. v. Governor of Pentonville
Prison, ex p. Ecke, [1974] Crim. L.R. 102 (D.C.).
16 [1987] 2 All E.R. 985 (H.L.). This case was referred to recently by the Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council on appeal from the Bahamas in United States
Government v. Bowe, [1989] 3 All E.R. 315, 326, as good authority for the liberal
interpretation principle.
17 [ 1896] l o B. 5o9 and 517.
18 Ibid., 517.
19 [1973] 3 All E.R. 250, 254; [1973] 1 W.L.R. 969, 973.
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ing that principle Lord Bridge held that states parties to bilat-
eral extradition treaties have entered into reciprocal rights and
duties for the purpose of bringing to justice those who have
committed grave crimes and thus to "apply to extradition trea-
ties the strict canons appropriate to the construction of domes-
tic legislation would often tend to defeat rather than to serve
this purpose." 20 Thus, Postlewaite indicates that the underly-
ing intention of the high contracting parties should be sought
in interpreting the treaty provision.2 1
This emphasis on interstate co-operation in an era of trans-
national and international crime may be seen as conflicting
with the protective function of extradition law. One commen-
tator has suggested that "The conflict between the cooperative
and protective functions of extradition law creates a certain
tension, something exacerbated by the different views among
states about the exact place of extradition in the criminal pro-
cess. To the extent that extradition is seen [as] simply part of
the process of gaining custody of the fugitive, the protections
appropriate are relatively slight and the matter may be
regarded as administrative rather than judicial. "22 The protec-
tive side of the extradition procedure clearly emphasizes the
penal law aspects and provides protective safeguards for the
fugitive.2 3 The Postlewaite case discussed above, however,
illustrates a preferment for the cooperative approach which
can also be seen in other recent extradition cases dealing with
evidentiary issues,24 the political offence exception, 25 and the
double criminality rule.26
On this issue of interpretation, then, it appears that courts
20 Supra note 16, at 992.
21 Ibid.
22 Warbrick, supra note 14, at 5 (footnotes omitted).
23 For a recent case where the European Court of Human Rights held that extradi-
tion to Switzerland involved a violation of the European Convention on Human
Rights, Article 5 ()(f), see Bozano v. France, E.C.H.R. Sec. A/iii (1987), 9
E.H.R.R. 297. Also see J. Quigley, "The Rule of Non-Inquiry and the Impact of
Human Rights on Extradition Law," (199o) 15 N. Carol. J. Int'l L. and Comm.
Reg. 401.
24 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Office, ex p. Rees, [1986] 2 All E.R. 321, and
Re Muir, T.L.R., Dec. i 1, 1987.
25 Cheng v. Governor of PentonviUe Prison, [1973] 2 All E.R. 204, and Keane v.
Governor of Brixton Prison, [1972] 1 All E.R. 1163.
26 See in particular, Government of Denmark v. Nielsen, [1984] 2 All E.R. 81, and
U.S. Government v. McCaffery, [1984] 2 All E.R. 570.
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in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States have in
recent times laid emphasis on the co-operative intent of states
parties to extradition treaties when called upon to interpret
their provisions. It is only when the domestic statute is in
question that the courts have been more protective; then the
penal aspects have been stressed and ambiguities have been
construed in favour of the fugitive.27 In Regina v. Governor of
Pentonville Prison, ex parte Cheng, Lord Simon of Glaisdale
stated in the House of Lords decision that "It follows that the
positive powers under the Act [i.e., to extradite] should be
given a restrictive construction and the exceptions from those
positive powers a liberal construction." 28 He further stated
that "Since the common law, as so often, favours the freedom
of the individual, the rules enjoining strict construction of a
penal statute or of a provision in derogation of liberty ...
merely reinforce the presumptions against change in the com-
mon law.''29
It is re-emphasized here that should the treaty obligation or
the Extradition Act itself violate a Charter right, it will have
no force or affect, unless it falls with the "reasonable limita-
tion" rule of section I of the Charter. It is fundamental that
international treaty expediency will not take precedence over
the Charter of Rights.
II. DEATH SENTENCE EXCEPTION AND THE FUGITIVE IN
CANADA
A. EXTRADITION PURSUANT TO THE EXTRADITION ACT AND
TREATIES
Several of Canada's extradition treaties, including the 1976
Treaty with the United States, 0 and those with Austria, 31
27 See Re Aronson, [1989] 3 W.L.R. 436, 466. See also Halsbury's Statutes of England
(annotated), Extradition Act, 1989, c. 33, at 33/2.
28 [1973] 2 All E.R. 204, 217; [1973] A.C. 931, 954.
29 Ibid.
30 1976 Can. T.S. No. 3; 27 U.S.T.S. 983, Art. 6. Note also by way of comparative
analysis, that the European Convention on Extradition, 1957, E.T.S. No. 24, 597
U.N.T.S. 338, Art. II, also so provides. See Bassiouni, op. cit. supra note i, at
491-93. The Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
Treatment of Offenders recently recommended that the Model Treaty on Extradi-
tion likewise contain such an article: see Report of the Congress, Cuba, Oct. 5,
1990.
31 1969 Can. T.S. No. 24.
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Israel,32 Germany,"3 and Sweden 3 4 provide that where the
extradition offence is punishable by death under the laws of
the requesting state and the laws of the requested state do not
allow this punishment for that offence, the requested state may
refuse extradition unless the requesting state provides such
assurances as the requested state considers sufficient that the
death penalty shall not be imposed, or if imposed, shall not be
carried out.
The Extradition Act does not deal with the question of pen-
alties. However, two observations are pertinent. The first is
that its section 3 provides that, with respect to any conflict
between the sections of the Act and the articles of one of Cana-
da's extradition treaties, the treaty will prevail. This is an
exception to the usual rule in Canada that the domestic statute
will take precedence. However, as was indicated in the pre-
vious section, if these treaty provisions run counter to the
guarantees provided to the individual in the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, 3 5 the provisions of the Charter will prevail.3 6
The second observation is that, even though the Act does not
specifically address the refusal to extradite by the Minister of
Justice on account of the potential of the death penalty in the
requesting state, a broad interpretation of the specialty rule
would encompass this question and be a ground for challenge
by the fugitive and by the requested state if the fugitive had
been extradited on the basis that assurances were given that the
death penalty, if handed down, would not be carried out. Bas-
siouni 7 has suggested that if the requested state wishes to
impose the condition, it must explicitly indicate it when grant-
ing the extradition request. If it does not do so, the request-
ing/prosecuting state may consider it only as "a recommenda-
tion for leniency." 38 He concluded by saying that "It is not yet
well established if such a condition is binding on the request-
ing state, as it may be considered an infringement of its sover-
32 1969 Can. T.S. No. 25.
33 Supra note 3.
34 1976 Can. T.S. No. 8.
35 Supra note io.
36 Ibid., s. 52.
37 Op. cit. supra note i, at 366, citing In re Cortks, [1934] A.D. 356 (Argentina,
Camara Federal de la Capital).
38 Ibid., citing In re Oberbichler, [1934] 7 A.D. 354 (Italy, Court of Criminal Cassa-
tion).
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eignty. However, if the requesting state accepts the condition,
it would become part of the principle of specialty." 9
A full discussion of the specialty rule is not possible here,
but it is central to the extradition process, 40 as it protects the
fugitive from unexpected charges and even unexpected penal-
ties once extradited. It also fulfils the function of protecting
the requested state from abuse of its extradition processes. 4'
This issue of the death penalty exception is not only of
academic interest to Canada, which has a longstanding extra-
dition basis with the United States and, for obvious geographi-
cal reasons, the majority of whose extradition requests come
from the United States, a country in which many states have
not abolished the death penalty. Thus, Canada has an interest
in the efficacy of the process and of continued co-operation in
criminal matters including extradition. Nevertheless, the
human rights protections of the fugitive found in Canada can-
not be denied. It is a difficult task to strike the appropriate
balance between the two.
B. COMMONWEALTH RENDITION UNDER THE FUGITIVE
OFFENDERS ACT
The Canadian Fugitive Offenders Act is based upon the
1881 British Fugitive Offenders Act4 2 which, it is crucial to
39 Ibid.
40 The rule requires that once the surrender of the fugitive has occurred, the request-
ing state may only prosecute him or her for the offence for which extradition was
granted unless the fugitive has had a reasonable opportunity of leaving the
requesting/prosecuting state. The rule may be found in domestic legislation such
as section 33 of Canada's Extradition Act or in bilateral or multilateral extradition
treaties. It is, however, a matter of debate whether it can be classified as a rule of
customary international law and may thus be raised by the fugitive even where
statutory or treaty provision is absent. In support of the view, see P. Gully Hart
and D. Poncet, "Rapport sur le principe de la specialit6 en mati~re d'extradition,"
unpublished paper presented at a Conference on Extradition, Siracusa, Sicily, Dec.
2, 1989. Note the view expressed by La Forest, J. in Parisien v. The Queen, [1988]
S.C.R. 950, 957, where he stated: "This is seen by some as a customary rule of
international law, but it seems to me to arise out of a proper construction of the
treaty." See also S. Z. Feller, "Reflections on the Nature of the Specialty Principle
in Extradition Relations," (1977) 12 Israel L. Rev. 466, 487.
41 As to both the fugitive and the requested state being beneficiaries of this rule, see
American Law Institute, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, C.7 , s. 477, para. (b) (1987).
42 55 and 45 Vict., c. 69; replaced by the Extradition Act, 1989, c. 33. As G. V. La
Forest, as he then was, noted in Extradition To and From Canada 153, note i (2nd
ed., 1977): "The repeal of the British Act by Great Britain in 1967 had no effect in
Canada because of the Statute of Westminster."
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note, contains no death penalty exception. The British statute
was enacted at a time when it was felt that there was no need
for the same safeguards for the fugitive and no need for the
rigid formality of the extradition process with "foreign"
states.4" This creature of the British Empire enabled fugitives
to be rendited from one part of the Empire to another without
the same potential roadblocks that could be raised in an extra-
dition hearing. It should, however, be borne in mind that then
the fugitive never left the jurisdiction of the highest appellate
court, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. In effect,
the British imperial parliament sitting in Westminster held
the responsibility for the administration of justice in the
Empire. 44 This simplified procedure was founded on a special
and close relationship.
The Fugitive Offenders Act that still applies in Canada does
not, therefore, impose the traditional safeguards found in
extradition law, such as specialty, the political offence excep-
tion, and double criminality. There are no treaties and no list
of scheduled offences. The omission of these formal safeguards
clearly illustrates the different principles and assumptions
that rendition between Commonwealth countries was based
on. With the change from Empire to Commonwealth and the
resulting change in constitutional status of the member coun-
tries, many questions arose as to whether the 1881 Fugitive
Offenders Act was appropriate and in fact whether it still
applied to all Commonwealth countries. 45
43 See Re Harrison (igi8), 25 B.C.R. 433, 437; Ex parte Lillywhite (1901), 19
N.Z.L.R. 502, 505.
44 See P. O'Higgins, "Extradition Within the Commonwealth," (196o) 9 Int'l &
Comp. L.Q. 486; "Recent Practice under the Fugitive Offenders Act," [1965] Crim.
L. Rev. 133; and R. Clute, "Law and Practice in Commonwealth Extradition,"
(1959) 8 Am. J. Int'l L. 8, 15-22.
45 Under the existing Canadian Fugitive Offenders Act, SS. 2 and 3, the Act applies to
any part of Her Majesty's realms and territories. If this is correctly interpreted as
meaning those countries that recognize the Queen as the head of state, there are a
large number of Commonwealth countries to which rendition is not possible. In
the case of Madras v. C. G. Menon, [1954] A.I.R. 517 (S.C.), (1954) I.L.R. 46, the
Supreme Court of India held that the fugitive could not be rendited to the United
Kingdom as India was no longer one of Her Majesty's Dominions. It is interesting
to see that this case would appear to have had no effect on the reverse situation, the
surrender of fugitives from the United Kingdom to India. See O'Higgins, "Recent
Practice," supra note 44, at 134, and J. N. Saxena, "India: The Extradition Act,
1962," (1963) 12 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 1 16. Note the interesting recent case of R. v.
Brixton Prison Governor ex parte Kahan, [1989] 2 All E.R. 368, concerning a
request by Fiji for rendition from the United Kingdom, where it was held that Fiji
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Another fact of international life cannot be ignored; there
has been a dimunition of shared political and social objectives
between the member states of the Commonwealth, whose over-
all complexion has clearly and drastically changed since 1881.
The constituent members cannot be seen to be aligned on all
issues and certainly the United Kingdom does not exercise
dominion and control. For most countries in the Common-
wealth, appeal to the Privy Council no longer exists.
In 1966 a Commonwealth conference was held in London,
England, and the following year the United Kingdom replaced
the 1881 Act with the 1967 Fugitive Offenders Act, as did a
number of other Commonwealth countries. Canada did not
follow suit. The new Commonwealth scheme adopted by the
United Kingdom and others provided for the specialty and the
double criminality rules mentioned earlier. However, on the
death penalty, silence was maintained. The only relevant pro-
vision in the 1967 United Kingdom Act was section 3 (1),
which stipulated that a relevant offence for rendition purposes
(i), when the United Kingdom was the requested state, was
one against the law of a designated Commonwealth country
and, however described by that law, fell within any of the
descriptions set out in Schedule i to the 1967 Act, and was
punishable under that law by a term of twelve months' impri-
sonment or any other greater punishment, and (2), in the case
of an offence against United Kingdom law, was punishable by
that law with imprisonment of the same term or any greater
form of punishment.
Section 3 of the Canadian Fugitive Offenders Act provides
that rendition may occur for an offence punishable in the
place where it was committed by imprisonment with hard
labour for a term of twelve months or any greater punishment.
It would not therefore on its face prevent rendition when the
death penalty might be applied, as that penalty would appear
to fit the category of "any greater punishment." Even though
in Re Fugitive Offenders Act and Hon Kwing Shum 46 Cattan-
ach, J. of the Federal Court Trial Division held that the term
was entitled to so request, albeit that its membership in the Commonwealth had
lapsed when it became a Republic, as it was still a "designated Commonwealth
country" in the pertinent United Kingdom list.
46 June 2, 1977 (unreported), cited by La Forest, op. cit. supra note 42, at 155.
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"any greater punishment was tied to it being a term greater
than twelve months with hard labour and not simply a longer
term," he did state that he would find it hard to believe that
capital punishment or life imprisonment would not fall
within this category.4 7
The only relevant section is section 17, which provides for
the refusal of rendition because it would be unjust. It states:
Whenever it appears to the court that by reason of the trivial nature
of the case, or by reason of the application for the return of a fugitive
not being made in good faith, in the interests of justice, or that, for
any reason, it would, having regard to the distance, to the facilities
for communication, and to all the circumstances of the case, be
unjust or oppressive or too severe a punishment to return the fugi-
tive either at all or until the expiration of a certain period, the court
may: (a) discharge the fugitive, either absolutely or on bail; (b) order
that he shall not be returned until after the expiration of the period
named in the order; or (c) make such other order in the premises
[sic], as to the court seems just. R.S., c. 127, s. 17.
However, La Forest has suggested that "that section... should
not be expected to bear the whole burden of what has now
become an obsolete and defective piece of legislation."48 In the
extradition process, Canada has the opportunity to put into its
extradition treaties a provision that mentions the death penalty
exception. In the case of rendition, apart from reliance upon
the judiciary under section 17, there is nothing. Some Com-
monwealth countries such as Jamaica still retain the death
penalty. For these reasons, even though review of the decision
of the governor general to rendite would be reviewable by the
courts and if not compatible with the Charter of Rights be
struck down, it would be preferable to take the same statutory
and even treaty approach with regard to all countries, Com-
monwealth or otherwise.
The Law Reform Commission of Canada stated in 1984 that
"we have seen enough to convince us of the need to modernize
our statutes concerning these subjects. However, before that
can be done, the federal government will have to seek answers
to questions such as.... Does Canada need two Acts? Would
not one suffice? Is there any longer a need to differentiate
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid., 157 (emphasis added).
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between 'extradition' and 'rendition'?"4 9 And it recommended
"that the Extradition Act and the Fugitive Offenders Act be
amended to provide for uniformity of treatment of persons
under both Acts."5 0
The Charter of Rights has already been seen to play a large
part in assessing Canada's extradition legislation. 51 There is a
need to treat fugitives in the extradition and rendition pro-
cesses in the same way. The sections of the Charter dealing
with the right to life, liberty, and security of the person, and
the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with
the principles of fundamental justice,5 2 and its provisions
dealing with equality before and under the law, equal protec-
tion and equal benefit of the law without discrimination, 53
apply.
C. CONCLUSIONS
Thus, the current Canadian position to be debated may be
summed up as follows. First, do Canada's Extradition Act and
treaties with countries that retain the death penalty violate the
provisions of sections 7 and 12 of the Charter of Rights? Sec-
tion 7 was mentioned above. Section 12 provides that everyone
has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual
punishment or treatment.
Second, does Canada's Fugitive Offenders Act and potential
agreement for extradition without treaty under Part II of the
Extradition Act violate the same Charter rights? Clearly,
should the extradition process be seen as excepting extradition
where the death penalty may be imposed based on these Char-
ter provisions, the Fugitive Offenders Act and non-treaty
extradition must be similarly viewed. Fugitive offender and
Part II fugitives would be denied fundamental justice and be
subjected to inequality before and under the law if this were
not to be so. Why should X being rendited to a Common-
49 Working Paper 37, Extraterritorial Legislation, 137.
50 Ibid., 137, Rec. 63.
51 See, for example, the trilogy of United States v. Schmidt, supra note 9; Republic of
Argentina v. Hector Mellino, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536; and United States v. Allard and
Charette, [19871 1 S.C.R. 564. See also United States v. Cotroni, [1989] S.C.R. 1469.
52 Section 7.
53 Section 15.
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wealth country with the death penalty, not have the same pro-
tection as Y being extradited to the United States?
A Charter argument was raised in the case of Her Majesty
the Queen on behalf of Great Britain v. Taylor.54 This case
dealt with the lack of a double criminality requirement in the
Fugitive Offenders Act, as contrasted with the Extradition Act.
Mr. Taylor argued, inter alia, that under the Fugitive Offend-
ers Act his Charter rights guaranteed by sections 7 and 15 were
being infringed.55 Judge Scullion held that there was no such
breach of his rights under the Charter "so fundamental as to
cause [him] to declare the [FOA] or parts thereof of no force
and effect under section 52 of the Charter."
In view of the aforegoing analysis, it is remarkable that
Judge Scullion in 1988 was able to come to the conclusion that
there is no need today for the same safeguards in rendition as
in extradition. To illustrate this, one need only turn to his
reference to the need for safeguards when extraditing to a
country where the laws and judicial systems are fundamentally
different as opposed to renditing to a Commonwealth country
sharing "a great deal of that common legal and political herit-
age." Albeit that in the nineteenth and early twentieth centu-
ries this was the case, it is not so today, as evidenced by the
perceived need for the same safeguards noted by the Common-
wealth scheme of 1967.
III. EXTRADITION 56 AND THE DEATH PENALTY: A
VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 7 AND 1 2 OF THE CHARTER OF
RIGHTS?
The heart of the debate on this question centres on whether
these sections of the Charter of Rights apply to cases where an
extradited individual will suffer adverse consequences because
of the punishment imposed in the requesting/receiving state.
There are two main issues that must be considered. The first is
54 Judgment delivered by Judge C. Scullion, June 29, 1988 (Ont. Prov. Ct.), (unre-
ported). See also the application for habeas corpus that was dismissed by Boland,
J., Ontario Court (General Division), Oct. 30, 1990.
55 He also argued s. 11.
56 From now on the term "extradition" will be used to cover rendition as well as
extradition without treaty pursuant to Part II of the Extradition Act, as in this
writer's view all must be treated in the same way. See supra.
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the intraterritorial or extraterritorial scope of the Charter in
relation to these cases. The second may in turn be divided into
two parts: Is a decision of the Minister to extradite to a state
that retains the death penalty, a violation of section 12 of the
Charter in that the fugitive will be subjected upon return to
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment? And if extradi-
tion is held not to be contrary to section 12, will section 7 still
be violated in that the extradition will deprive the fugitive of
the right to life, liberty, and security of the person? The basic
point here is necessarily whether the decision to extradite con-
forms to the principles of fundamental justice.
In order to probe these questions it will be very useful to
analyse first of all the recent decision of the European Court of
Human Rights in Soering v. United Kingdom,57 as it deals
with a relatively similar situation.
A. IMPACT OF THE SOERING CASE
Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in Stras-
bourg based on the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms58 and its relevant
protocols are not binding on Canada, as it is not, and as a non-
European country cannot be, a member59 of the Council of
Europe under its current constitution. However, since the
Canadian Charter of Rights utilizes the language, in part, of
the European Convention, most certainly the decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights will be of persuasive value
in Canada. Already, Canadian courts, including the Supreme
Court of Canada, have had occasion to refer to the Convention
and the Court's decisions. As well, on August 19, 1976, the
57 (1989), 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A.); reprinted in (1989), i1 Eur. H. Rts. Rep. 439,
and in (1989) 28 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1O63.
58 (1950) 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
59 Member states are as follows: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Ger-
many, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta,
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tur-
key, and the United Kingdom. S. Breitenmoser and G. Wilms, "Human Rights v.
Extradition: The Soering Case," (199o) ii Mich. J. Int'l L. 845, note 2, suggest
that several Eastern European states are in the process of applying to become
parties to the Convention, as a precondition for membership generally in the
Council of Europe. They state that this is because the Council of Europe restricts
its membership to those states who are committed to the rule of law and the
enjoyment of human rights and freedoms.
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights60 and
Optional Protocol 6' came into force in Canada. Likewise,
Canadian courts have not been reticent in citing applicable
Covenant articles to assist in the interpretation of similar lan-
guage in the Canadian Charter.62
In this regard the recent unanimous judgment of the Euro-
pean Court of Justice in Soering v. United Kingdom 63 is espe-
cially important, for it concerned a request by the United
States of America to the United Kingdom for the extradition of
the fugitive Jens Soering on charges of capital murder. Fol-
lowing his committal for surrender by the extradition judge,
Mr. Soering applied for a writ of habeas corpus and for leave
to apply for judicial review. Both applications were refused by
the Divisional Court. This case eventually went to the Euro-
pean Court and the judgment rendered on July 7, 1989 will, as
two commentators have aptly stated, "have some accelerating
effect on future discussion of extradition law and the value of
human rights in such proceedings." 64
i. Facts of the Soering Case
Jens Soering was born on August 1, 1966, and was a Ger-
man national. The United States extradition request was for
two charges of murder committed in the Commonwealth of
Virginia in March 1985. The victims, William and Nancy
Haysom, were killed as a result of multiple and massive slash
wounds to the neck, throat, and body; they were the parents of
Jens Soering's girlfriend, Elizabeth Haysom, who was a Cana-
6o 1976 Can. T.S. No. 47.
6t Ibid.
62 See S. A. Williams and A. L. C. de Mestral, An Introduction to International Law
34-35 (2nd ed., 1987); M. Cohen and A. Bayefsky, "The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms and Public International Law," (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 265;
L. C. Green, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and International Law," (1982) 20
Canadian Yearbook of International Law 3, and J. Claydon, "The International
Law of Human Rights and Canadian Courts," Proceedings of the 1981 Conference
of the Canadian Council on International Law 2.
63 Supra note 57. Also see the affirmation of Soering in The Netherlands v. Short,
translated from the Dutch and reprinted in (1990) 29 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1375 (Nether-
lands Supreme Court).
64 Breitenmoser and Wilms, supra note 59, at 847. R.B. Lillich in "The Soering
Case," (1991) 85 Am. J. Int'l L. 128, 141, has commented that its true significance
will unfold as other states react to it.
132 The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 199o
dian citizen. Both Soering and Elizabeth Haysom were stu-
dents at the University of Virginia. In October 1985 both dis-
appeared from Virginia, but were arrested in April 1986 in
England for cheque fraud.
In June 1986 Soering was interviewed in England by a
police investigator from Virginia. The investigator recorded in
a sworn affidavit that Soering had admitted the killings; his
motive was that he was in love with Elizabeth Haysom but her
parents were opposed to the relationship. The United States of
America requested in August 1986 the extradition of Soering
and Elizabeth Haysom under the 1972 United Kingdom-
United States Extradition Treaty.65 Soering was charged with
two counts of alleged capital murder and two counts of the
separate non-capital murders of the parents. Elizabeth Hay-
som was surrendered to the United States in May 1987. In
August 1987 she pleaded guilty as an accessory to the murder
of her parents and was sentenced on October 6, 1987, to ninety
years' imprisonment.
Concerning Soering, on September 12, 1987, he was arrested
following the issue of a warrant by a magistrate at Bow Street
Magistrate's Court. The British Embassy in Washington
requested from the United States authorities an assurance con-
cerning the death penalty based on Article 4 of the Extradition
Treaty. This article is in similar terms to Article 6 of the
Canada-United States Extradition Treaty. 66 The request read
as follows:
Because the death penalty has been abolished in Britain, the
Embassy has been instructed to seek an assurance, in accordance
with the terms of... the Extradition Treaty, that, in the event of Mr.
Soering being surrendered and convicted of the crimes for which he
has been indicted ... the death penalty, if imposed, will not be
carried out.
Should it not be possible on constitutional grounds for the United
States to give such an assurance, the United Kingdom authorities ask
that the United States Government undertake to recommend to the
appropriate authorities that the death penalty should not be imposed
or, if imposed, should not be executed. 7
65 28 U.S.T., 227; 23o T.I.A.S. No. 8468.
66 See supra 30.
67 See supra note 57, para. 15.
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Meanwhile, the Federal Republic of Germany, as the state of
Mr. Soering's nationality,68 also requested his extradition to
Germany under the 1872 Treaty for the Mutual Surrender of
Fugitive Criminals, as amended by an Agreement of 196o and
an Exchange of Notes in 1978,69 between the Federal Republic
of Germany and the United Kingdom. In the United King-
dom, the Secretary of State was advised by the Director of
Public Prosecutions that, although the German request sup-
ported the jurisdiction over the crime aspect, the evidence sub-
mitted did not amount to a prima facie case 70 and that an
extradition magistrate in the United Kingdom, therefore,
under the terms of the Extradition Act, 1870, would not be able
to commit the fugitive for surrender to Germany. The only
evidence the German government had were admissions made
by Soering to a German prosecutor (Staatsanwalt) from Bonn
when he was interviewed in prison in Britain. 71 Furthermore,
the Director of the Office of International Affairs, Criminal
Division, United States Department of Justice, was informed
by the Attorney of Bedford County, Virginia, that there was no
means of compelling witnesses from the United States to
appear in a German criminal court.72 The United States con-
cluded that the British should give preference to the United
States request over the German one. 73
The result was that the United Kingdom on May 20, 1987,
informed the Federal Republic of Germany that, as they had
received the American request first and it was supported by
prima facie evidence, the court would continue to consider
that request in the normal way.74 It was also stressed that sur-
68 Ibid., para. 16. Most civil law states use the nationality basis of criminal jurisdic-
tion extensively. See J. G. Castel and Sharon A. Williams, "The Extradition of
Canadian Citizens and Sections i and 6(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms," (1987) 25 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 263.
69 These agreements are incorporated into United Kingdom law by Orders in Coun-
cil (the Federal Republic of Germany (Extradition) Order 196o, S.I. 196o/1375 and
the Federal Republic of Germany (Extradition) (Amendment) Order 1978, S.I.
1978/1403).
70 The test for the prima facie case "is whether, if the evidence before the Magistrate
stood alone at the trial, a reasonable jury properly directed could accept it and find
a verdict of guilty": see Schtraks v. Government of Israel, [1964] A.C. 556.
71 Supra note 57, para. 16.
72 Ibid., para. 17.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid., para. 19.
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render to the United States would be subject to receiving satis-
factory assurances concerning the death penalty. The affidavit
of the Attorney of Bedford County of June i, 1987, which was
transmitted to the United Kingdom under the cover of a diplo-
matic note, is worth quoting; it reads as follows: "I hereby
certify that should Jens Soering be convicted of the offence of
capital murder as charged in Bedford County, Virginia ... a
representation will be made in the name of the United King-
dom to the judge at the time of sentencing that it is the wish of
the United Kingdom that the death penalty should not be
imposed or carried out." 75 This assurance seems to have
addressed only the second paragraph of the 1986 British
request. 76
2. Court Proceedings in the United Kingdom
The committal proceedings took place on June 16, 1987, at
the Bow Street Magistrates' Court. The Chief Magistrate com-
mitted Soering to await the Secretary of State's order for extra-
dition to the United States. Following his committal for
surrender, Soering applied to the Divisional Court for a writ
of habeas corpus and for leave to apply for judicial review. On
December 11, 1987, both applications were refused.
Some aspects of these proceedings merit further considera-
tion. Soering had argued in support of his application for
judicial review that the assurances concerning the death pen-
alty given by the United States were worthless and that no
reasonable Secretary of State could have regarded them as sat-
isfying Article 4 of the Extradition Treaty. Lord Justice Lloyd
agreed with Soering that "the assurance leaves something to
be desired." 77 He stated further that:
Article IV of the Treaty contemplates an assurance that the death
penalty will not be carried out. That must presumably mean an
assurance by or on behalf of the Executive Branch of Government,
which in this case would be the Governor of the Commonwealth of
Virginia. The certificate sworn by Mr. Updike, far from being an
75 Ibid., para. 2o. This assurance was requested in a similar fashion in further
affidavits by the same person, Mr. James Updike, the Attorney of Bedford County.
76 Supra note 57.
77 Ibid., para. 22, quoted by the European Court of Human Rights.
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assurance on behalf of the Executive, is nothing more than an
undertaking to make representations on behalf of the United King-
dom to the judge. I cannot believe that this is what was intended
when the Treaty was signed.78
Lord Justice Lloyd did not therefore put much weight on the
assurance but said that on account of the federal nature of the
United States, it might have been difficult to get more. Having
said this, he went on to hold that judicial review was refused at
that stage because the claim was premature; the Secretary of
State had not decided at that time to accept the assurance as
satisfactory. This position is in keeping with the Kindler79 and
Ng 80 decisions so far in Canada, in that the courts will not
review an administrative decision until it has been made.
On June 30, 1988, the House of Lords rejected Soering's
petition for leave to appeal against the decision of the Div-
isional Court and, following a further rejection by the Secre-
tary of State of a petition by the fugitive requesting him to
exercise his discretion not to make the order for surrender
under section ii of the 187o Extradition Act, Soering was
ordered surrendered to the United States.
At that juncture, instead of seeking review of the adminis-
trative decision of the Secretary of State, Soering followed the
route to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg,
the United Kingdom having ratified the European Convention
on Human Rights. The United Kingdom has not enacted
implementing legislation. 8 In any judicial review proceed-
ings before the British Courts, he could have asked the court to
review the exercise of the discretion to extradite him on the
ground that it was tainted with illegality, irrationality, or pro-
cedural impropriety. 82 In determining what is "irrationality,"
78 Ibid.
79 See infra, 139-41.
8o See infra, 139-41.
81 See C. Warbrick, "Reasonableness and the Decision to Extradite: Re Kirkwood,"
[1984] Public Law 539, 543, where the author argues that the orthodox view that a
treaty has no internal effect until implemented "should not carry the same weight
in relation to assessing an exercise of a ministerial power." As to the so-called
constitutional orthodoxy that a ratified but unimplemented treaty is not part of
domestic law, see Malone v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis (No. 2),
[1979] 2 All E.R. 620, 638 (per Sir Robert Megarry, V.C.).
82 Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1984]
3 All E.R. 935 (C.A.). B. Robertson, "Extradition, Inhuman Treatment, and the
Death Penalty," (199 o ) 154 Justice Peace 231, 232, has argued that because this
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the so-called "Wednesbury principles" of reasonableness
would have been used.8 3 The test in an extradition case may be
summed up as identifying whether "no reasonable Secretary of
State could have made an order for return in the circumstan-
ces." This could be viewed from the perspective of acceptance
of the assurance and whether there was a serious risk of inhu-
man or degrading treatment if returned.84
According to the case of R. v. Home Secretary, ex parte
Bugdaycay,85 a case dealing with a refusal to grant asylum, the
House of Lords explained that the courts will apply the prin-
ciples of reasonableness extremely strictly in a case where the
life of the applicant is at risk. As the Court stated, "the court
must, I think, be entitled to subject an administrative decision
to the most rigorous examination, to ensure that it is in no
way flawed, according to the gravity of the issue which the
decision determines. The most fundamental of all human
rights is the individual's right to life and, when an administra-
tive decision under challenge is said to be one which may put
the applicant's life at risk, the basis of the decision must surely
call for the most anxious scrutiny." 86 Lord Templeman added:
"In my opinion where the result of a flawed decision may
imperil life or liberty a special responsibility lies on the court
in the examination of the decision-making process."8 7
One final point can be drawn from R. v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department, ex parte Kirkwood,8 8 namely that
the courts of the United Kingdom will not review a decision of
the Secretary of State by reason only of the fact that he or she
judicial review existed, Soering had not exhausted his local remedies, required by
Art. 26 of the European Convention. The Strasbourg court did not address this
issue.
83 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation, [1948] 1
K.B. Rep. 223 (C.A.).
84 Supra note 57, para. 35.
85 Ibid.
86 [1987] 1 All E.R. 840, 952, per Lord Bridge.
87 Ibid., 956.
88 [1984] 2 All E.R. 390; [1984] 1 W.L.R. 913 (Q.B.D.), and Re Kirkwood and re an
application for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, Feb. 14, 1984, unre-
ported. In Kirkwood, as in Soering, the United States had not guaranteed that the
death sentence would not be carried out, but had only promised to present the
United Kingdom's wish to the court in California. Kirkwood also applied to the
European Commission: see Applic. no. 10479/83.
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failed to consider the question of breach of the European Con-
vention on Human Rights.89
3. Application before the European Court of Human Rights
The European Court of Human Rights was seized of the
case following an application by Soering to the European
Commission on Human Rights.9° The Commission had indi-
cated9' to the United Kingdom government that it was desir-
able in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of
the proceedings, not to extradite until the Commission had
examined the application and subsequently until the case had
been referred to the court. On November io, 1988, the Com-
mission declared the application admissible and on January
19, 1989, produced its report. The case was brought by the
Commission before the Court on January 25, 1989, by the
United Kingdom on January 30, 1989, and by the Federal
Republic of Germany on February 3, 1989.
The object of the request by the Commission and of the two
governmental applications to the Court was to obtain a deci-
sion as to whether the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the
United Kingdom of its obligations under Articles 3, 6, and 13
of the Convention. 92 Article 3 provides that "No one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment"; Article 6.3 that "Everyone charged with a crim-
inal offence has the following minimum rights ... (c) to
defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his
own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to pay for legal
assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so
require"; and Article 13 that "Everyone whose rights and free-
doms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an
effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding
89 The courts in Kirkwood relied upon R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment, ex parte Fernandes, [1981 ] Imm. A.R. i, a deportation case, where the Court
of Appeal held that the Home Secretary was under no duty to take into account the
European Convention. See also R. v. Chief Immigration Officer, ex parte Bibi,
[1976] 1 W.L.R. 979. Kirkwood also relied upon Art. 7 of the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 6o.
90 Applic. no. 14038/88 of July 8, 1988, pursuant to Art. 25 of the Convention.
gi In accordance with Rule 36 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure.
92 Pursuant to Rule 33, s. 3 (d), of the Rules of Court, the applicant stated that he
wished to take part in the proceedings.
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that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity."
The Court held unanimously that Article 3 would be vio-
lated if the decision to extradite Soering to the United States
were implemented; as to Article 6.3(c), it had no jurisdiction to
entertain the complaint; and that there was no violation of
Article 13.93 Considering that the finding regarding Article 3
amounted in itself to just satisfaction, the Court did not view
itself as empowered to make accessory directions as to enforce-
ment of judgment. The reasoning behind the judgment of the
court will be discussed in the sections that follow, as it is of
great comparative interest to Canadians.
B. APPLICABILITY OF SECTIONS 7 AND 12 OF THE
CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS IN CASES OF
EXTRADITION
1. Respective Roles of the Minister of Justice and Judiciary
Canadian courts have taken the view that the discretion set
out in a bilateral treaty concerning non-extradition where the
death penalty exists, lies with the Minister of Justice. The
essential difference between committal for surrender by the
extradition judge and the decision to surrender by the Minister
has been made. The extradition judge can only receive evi-
dence relevant to his or her function under the Act. 94 In Argen-
tina v. Mellino,95 La Forest, J. stated that "the sole purpose of
an extradition hearing is to ensure that the evidence estab-
lishes a prima facie case that the extradition crime has been
committed."96 In this case, and also in U.S.A. v. Schmidt,97 he
stressed that the extradition judge and hearing play a modest
role in the overall process, barring statutory or treaty excep-
93 The Commission's Report that is annexed to the judgment indicates that the
Commission was of the view that there had been a breach of Art. 13 (7 votes to 4)
but no breach of Art. 3 (6 votes to 5) or Art. 6.3(c) (unanimously). Note in particu-
lar the 6:5 vote on Art. 3, which was based on the rights of the accused to resort to
several levels of appeal. The commission declined to find that a period of years on
death row, thus caused, attained the degree of severity required.
94 See section 18.
95 (1987), 33 C.C.C. (3 d) 334, 349 (S.C.C.). This was an extradition case not dealing
with the death penalty but s. i i of the Charter.
96 [1987] S.C.R. 500.
97 Supra note 9.
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tions. Neither the Extradition Act nor treaty with any state
gives the extradition judge the role of either adjudicating on
the death penalty exception, or hearing evidence on the issue
and reporting it to the Minister. This is in contrast with the
extradition judge's role concerning the political offence excep-
tion; that judge today takes evidence on that matter pursuant
to section 15 of the Act. In U.S.A. v. Ng, 98 the Alberta Court of
Appeal recently held that the death sentence could be distin-
guished from the political offence exception because "This
evidence is, then, of a much different character than evidence
which goes to the exercise of a ministerial discretion and the
inclusion of a specific empowering provision militates
strongly against our implying one." 99 In the earlier case of
U.S.A. v. Kindler,100 the same position had been taken, namely
that any question of non-extradition by reason of the death
penalty is to be left to the Minister of Justice.
These decisions interpreting the Extradition Act and bilat-
eral treaty provisions like Article 6 of the Canada-United
States Treaty which was in issue in Ng and Kindler, are cor-
rect. Under current Canadian law, there is a division of func-
tion between the judiciary and the executive; their roles are
clearly different. The extradition judge must make sure that
all the nuts and bolts of extradition are in place, such as the
crime being extraditable, double criminality, and sufficiency of
evidence. On the other hand, when a fugitive has been com-
mitted for surrender and has unsuccessfully sought habeas
corpus or review by the provincial Court of Appeal or even by
the Supreme Court of Canada, the Minister makes the final
determination under section 25 of the Act, taking into account
a wide variety of matters. Thus, at the ministerial stage, the
fugitive may present to the Minister evidence on the death
penalty issue, both by way of oral'01 and written argument.
98 (1989), 97 A.R. 241 (Alta. C.A.), upholding the decision of the extradition judge,
Trussler J.
99 Ibid., 243.
100 22 C.C.C. (3 d) 90 (Qu . S.C.). In Bouthillier v. U.S., (Qu6. Superior Ct.), Case
No. 500-36-oo813-9oo, Feb. 1, 1991 (unreported), it was held by Pinard, J., sitting
on a habeas corpus application, that the decision as to whether a minimum
punishment of imprisonment was cruel and unusual was within the province of
the executive, subject then to judicial review.
tot In Kindler the Minister of Justice declined to hear viva voce evidence by Kindler
himself. It was thought that it would be inappropriate for the Canadian Minister
of Justice to be reconsidering credibility as to guilt or innocence.
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If the Minister of Justice decides to extradite with or without
assurances concerning the death penalty, the fugitive may seek
judicial review of that decision. 10 2 In effect, this gives the fugi-
tive a protracted period between the initial extradition judge's
committal for surrender and review of the Minister of Justice's
decision by the Federal Court, Trial Division, Court of Appeal
and finally the Supreme Court of Canada. 10
This area of extradition law is far from being solely of aca-
demic interest in Canada, as most of its extradition traffic lies
with the United States of America. Therefore, the reference to
the Supreme Court of Canada by the Governor in Council on
the issue of the death penalty is of fundamental importance.
The questions presented to the Court are as follows:104
Would the surrender by Canada of an extradition fugitive to the
United States of America, to stand trial for wilful or deliberate
murder for which the penalty upon conviction may be death, con-
stitute a breach of the fugitive's rights guaranteed under the Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms?
2 Did the Minister of Justice, in deciding pursuant to Article 6 of the
Extradition Treaty between Canada and the United States of Amer-
ica, to surrender the fugitive Charles Chitat Ng without seeking
assurances from the United States of America that the death pen-
alty would not be imposed on the said Charles Chitat Ng or, if
imposed, that it would not be executed, commit any of the errors
of law and jurisdiction alleged in the Statement of Claim filed in
the Federal Court of Canada (Trial Division) by the said Charles
Chitat Ng on October 30, 1989, having regard to the said State-
ment of Claim, the reasons given by the Minister of Justice for the
said decision and to any other material which the Court, in its
discretion, may receive and consider?
Other constitutional questions have been stated by Cory, J. of
the Supreme Court of Canada. These are:
102 The courts may review the exercise of a ministerial discretion on the basis of the
Charter of Rights: see Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, supra note 11.
1o3 It is clear that new legislation is needed in Canada to update the Extradition Act
and Fugitive Offenders Act from many perspectives. It must include a streamlin-
ing of the extradition review process and judicial review of the Minister of Justi-
ce's decision. There is too much duplication.
104 By Order-in-Council P.C. 1990-1082, dated June 7, 199o, promulgated pursuant
to s. 53(1) of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26. Oral hearing before the
Supreme Court of Canada scheduled for Feb. 21, 1991.
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3 Is s. 25 of the Extradition Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. E-23, to the extent
that it permits the Minister of Justice to order the surrender of a
fugitive for a crime for which the fugitive may be or has been
sentenced to death in the foreign state without first obtaining
assurances from the foreign state that the death penalty will not be
imposed, will not be executed, inconsistent with ss. 7 or 12 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms?
4 If the answer to question I is in the affirmative, is s. 25 of the
Extradition Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. E-2 3 , a reasonable limit of the
rights of a fugitive within the meaning of s. I of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and therefore not inconsistent
with the Constitution Act, 1982?105
In the Kindler case, when the Minister of Justice decided to
surrender without seeking assurances, Kindler sought review
by the Federal Court, Trial Division. At that level, Rouleau, J.
denied certiorari to quash the Minister's decision. 06 The
appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal likewise failed. In the
Ng case, Ng was committed for surrender on twelve counts of
murder, one count of attempted murder, two counts of con-
spiracy to commit murder, three counts of kidnapping, and
one count of burglary, by Trussler, J. the extradition judge,
whose decision was upheld on appeal by the Alberta Court of
Appeal. The Minister of Justice, as in Kindler, decided to
surrender without seeking assurances. The Ng case has not
gone through the Federal Court review process. The outcome
of the reference to the Supreme Court of Canada in this matter
will clarify a number of matters that are now uncertain.
2. Extraterritorial or Intraterritorial Application of the Charter
The applicability of the Charter provisions to extradition
cases is raised in the reference, as it is essential to decide
whether the sections in question are to be applied extraterri-
torially to conduct by other states abroad and hence prohibit
extradition, or whether their scope is merely intraterritorial to
Canada. If the latter perspective is taken, can these sections
prevent extradition on the basis that by extraditing to Canada
would put the person in a real risk of violation of right that
would be protected under the Charter in Canada? At the
outset, it can be said that none of the justices on the Supreme
105 See factum of the Attorney-General of Canada at p. 3.
io6 Joseph J. Kindler v. John Crosbie, Min. of Justice, [1987] 2 F.C. 145.
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Court of Canada has suggested extraterritorial application.
The crux of the matter is deciding what is intraterritorial
application.
It is worth repeating that extradition decisions by the Minis-
ter of Justice are subject to scrutiny by the courts under section
32 of the Charter. Nevertheless, it is crucial to note the judg-
ment of La Forest, J. in Schmidt where he stated that "there
cannot be any doubt that the Charter does not govern the
actions of a foreign country; see for example, Spencer v. The
Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 278. In particular the Charter cannot
be given extraterritorial effect to govern how criminal pro-
ceedings in a foreign country are to be conducted." 10 7 The
specific questions here are whether the Charter should be
applied to extradition cases where the death penalty exists in
the foreign state on the ground that this penalty has been
abolished in Canada and thus would deny the fugitive of his or
her right to life, liberty, and security of the person, and as well
would subject the person to cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment.
In Schmidt the Supreme Court of Canada held that the
"pre-eminence of the Constitution must be recognized."10 8 La
Forest, J. stated that "the treaty, the extradition hearing in this
country and the exercise of the executive discretion to surren-
der a fugitive must all conform to the requirements of the
Charter, including the principles of fundamental justice ...
The real question is whether the fugitive in the circumstances
of this case would, by virtue of her proposed extradition, be
deprived of this right in a manner that did not conform to the
principles of fundamental justice." 109 He went on to hold that:
I have no doubt either that in some circumstances the manner in
which the foreign state will deal with the fugitive on surrender,
whether that course of conduct is justifiable or not under the law of
that country, may be such that it would violate the principles of
fundamental justice to surrender an accused under those circumstan-
ces. To make the point, I need only refer to a case that arose before
the European Court on Human Rights, Altun v. Germany (1983), 5
E.H.R.R. 611, where it was established that prosecution in the
requesting country might involve the infliction of torture. Situations
107 Supra note 9, at 518.
io8 Ibid., 520.
1O9 Ibid.
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falling far short of this may well arise where the nature of the crimi-
nal proceedings or penalties in a foreign country sufficiently shocks
the conscience as to make a decision to surrender a fugitive for trial
there one that breaches the principles of fundamental justice
enshrined in s. 7.11'
The main focus is upon whether, in the particular circum-
stances of the case, surrender of a fugitive offends against the
basic demands of justice. In United States v. Allard and
Charette, La Forest, J. stated in a similar fashion that "[t]he
only question that really arises, in this case, is whether the
respondents will face a situation in the United States such that
the mere fact of the Canadian government surrendering the
respondents ... constitutes an infringement of fundamental
justice.... To arrive at [this conclusion].., it would be neces-
sary to establish that the respondents would face a situation
that is simply unacceptable."'1 Clearly, he was correct when
he stated that "the Courts must be extremely circumspect so as
to avoid interfering unduly in decisions that involve the good
faith and honour of [Canada] in its relations with other states.
In a word, judicial intervention must be limited to cases of real
substance."11 2
In an age of easy travel, the potential escape of fugitives
from justice is readily apparent. For the overall good of
society, it is essential that the extradition system be effective.
In Schmidt, La Forest, J. stated that what is needed is a process
of surrender that is "untrammelled by excessive technicality or
fastidious demands that foreign systems comply with [Cana-
dian] constitutional standards.""t 3 Most importantly to the
present debate, the learned justice said that "A decision to
surrender ... cannot be faulted as fundamentally unjust
because the operation of the foreign law in the particular cir-
cumstances has not been subjected to scrutiny to see if it will
110 Ibid., 522. For a review of the Altun v. Germany Application No. 102o8/83,
E.H.R.R. 61 1, dealing with the alleged violation of Article 3 of the European
Convention, see Drzemczewski, "Aliens and the European Rights Convention: A
General Survey," (1984) 2 Notre Dame Int'l & Comp. L.J. 99, 114-22.
111 [1987]1 S.C.R. 564, 572 (emphasis added). See also at 572 where he adds that the
undoubted role of the courts to review the Minister's decision must be one that is
exercised with caution.
112 Ibid., 523. See also at 528, where La Forest, J. stated that "The courts should only
intervene in compelling circumstances."
113 Ibid.
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conform to the standards of our system of justice."' 4 In Neely
v. Henkel (No. 1),115 the United States Supreme Court dealt
with the matter of reconciling guarantees under the United
States Constitution with extradition to Cuba; Harlan, J., giv-
ing the judgment of the Court, stated that "those [constitu-
tional] provisions have no relation to crimes committed
without the jurisdiction of the United States against the laws
of a foreign country.""' 6
In sum, La Forest, J. seems to be saying that the Charter
should not be given extraterritorial application in extradition
cases save in exceptional circumstances that shock the con-
science. 11 7 This view is in keeping with the decision of Pratte,
J. in the Federal Court of Appeal in Sukhwart Singh v. Minis-
ter of Employment and Immigration ,118 where it was held that
section 7 of the Charter applied only to deprivation of the
rights under that section by Canadian officials applying Cana-
dian law and not to deprivation of those rights by another
state's authorities on the return of the extradited person to his
or her own country.
Lamer, J. (as he then was), in a separate judgment in
Schmidt, stipulated that this was so.119 However, he then went
on to state that in his view the Charter applies intraterritor-
ially to extradition cases in Canada as a person is one
"charged with an offence."' 20 Wilson, J. concurred in the
114 Ibid. See also at 527.
115 (1901) i8o U.S. 1o9. For an analysis of U.S. case law dealing with the rule of non-
inquiry, see Quigley, supra note 23, at 403-15. M. C. Bassiouni, "Extradition
Reform Legislation in the United States, 1981-1983," (1984) 17 Akron L. Rev.
495, 571, has argued that this rule should be eroded in an appropriate case. See
also Gallina v. Fraser, 177 F. Supp. 856 (D. Conn. 1959), aff'd 278 F. 2d 77 (2d Cir.
196o), cert. den. 364 U.S. 851 (which adds some qualifications based upon proce-
dures and punishment too antipathetic to the court's sense of decency) and
Holmes v. Laird, 459 F. 2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. den. 409 U.S. 869. See also
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F. 2d 571, 583 (6th Cir. 1985) and Ahmad v. Wigen,
726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (extradition judge should determine whether
treatment would violate universally accepted principles of human rights). Note
M. C. Bassiouni, "The United States Model," in M. C. Bassiouni (ed.), Interna-
tional Criminal Law Procedure 405, 417 (1986).
116 Ibid., 122.
117 Supra note 9, at 522.
118 [1983] 2 F.C. 347, 349 (F.C.A.) per Pratte, J.
119 Ibid. 530.
120 This position is strange as the fugitive has not been charged in Canada but in the
foreign state. Wilson, J. had reservations on Lamer, J.'s opinion on this point. See
ibid., 535.
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unanimous disposition of the appeal in Schmidt but could not
concur in the reasons of La Forest, J.; she saw no question of
applying the Charter extraterritorially, and held that the fugi-
tive can plead the Charter in extradition proceedings.121 She
referred to the Harbhajan Singh122 case and stressed that it is
the process in Canada that must comply with fundamental
justice. It cannot be overlooked that in this deportation case
Wilson, J. took a contrary approach to the Sukhuwart Singh 123
decision; although she did not specifically state that she dis-
agreed with the validity of Pratte, J.'s position in that case, her
view was described by Rouleau, J. in Kindler v. MacDonald as
being "at odds with that adopted by the latter, and thus must
be considered to strongly imply that the passage quoted can no
longer be considered to be good law." 124
Even though Harbhajan Singh concerned deportation from
Canada, it is still instructive as the Supreme Court of Canada
held there that section 7 applies to everyone who is physically
present in Canada. Thus, this case would seem to suggest that
the fugitive faced with extradition is entitled to be dealt with
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice when
the Minister of Justice deals with the matter. Should the fugi-
tive have grounds for alleging that he or she has not been so
treated, for example, that the Minister has not acted reasonably
in seeking or getting assurances in satisfactory form pursuant
to Article 6 of the Canada-United States Extradition Treaty, 25
then the Singh case coupled with Operation Dismantle126 will
provide grounds for judicial review. The foundation of Wil-
son, J.'s reasons is that the Charter sections are not being
pleaded by the fugitive "as a defence in the projected trial [in
the foreign state] but as a defence to the extradition court's
grant of an order.... [The] argument in a nutshell is that the
extradition court would be violating [the Charter] if it made
such an order."
121 Supra note 9, at 531. Wilson, J. actually used the term "Canadian citizen" rather
than "fugitive" but it is suggested that this was because the fugitive, Susan
Schmidt, was a Canadian citizen.
122 Harbhajan Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R.
177.
123 Supra note i18.
124 [19851 1 EC. 676, 701 (F.C.T.D.) (dealing with deportation from Canada).
125 Supra note 30.
126 Supra note ii.
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From the case law mentioned above, then, it would appear
that the scope of the Charter is viewed in different ways by the
justices on the Supreme Court of Canada. La Forest, J. sees
Charter rights concerning criminal prosecutions as applying
only to criminal prosecutions in Canada; this is evidenced by
his opinions in Schmidt concerning sections 7 and 11 (h) of the
Charter,127 in The Republic of Argentina v. Mellino 128 con-
cerning sections 7 and i i(b), 129 and in United States v. Allard
and Charette1 30 concerning sections 7 and 1 1(b). It is only in
an exceptional case that the Charter should be applied to pre-
vent extradition; his comments on the Altun131 case and the
possibility of torture of the fugitive if returned, a situation that
would be totally unacceptable, is the only indication from him
that in a case with the right facts it may be appropriate to deny
extradition.
The issue here is whether the shocking of the conscience test
for applying section 7 would be met if the potential penalty in
the foreign state were one that has been abolished in Canada.
Further, would this test be met if the punishment in point can
be classified as cruel and unusual; if it "shocks the communal
conscience"?1 2
Lamer, J. and Wilson, J. would clearly take a different view
for different reasons. From the Singh 33 and Schmidt 134 cases,
it is not difficult to surmise that Wilson, J. had difficulty with
La Forest, J.'s reasoning that certain Charter provisions do
not apply simply because the extradition process in Canada is
not a criminal prosecution in Canada. She made the funda-
mental point that the Charter does apply; it is not extraterrito-
rial application but merely giving effect to it in Canada; the
extradition process must conform with the section 7 require-
ment of fundamental justice; the potential extraditee is classi-
fiable as "everyone" in section 7. Wilson, J. eloquently put the
position of the intraterritorial scope of the Charter in this
127 Re autrefois acquit, autrefois convict.
128 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 536.
129 Trial within a reasonable period of time.
130 [1987] 1 S.C.R. 564.
131 (1983)5 E.H.R.R. 611.
132 See Smith v. R. (1987), 40 D.L.R. (4 d) 435 (S.C.C.), per Wilson, J. See also
Bouthillier v. U.S.A., supra note ioo.
133 Supra note 122.
134 Supra note 9.
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way: "The effect is right here in Canada, in the Canadian
proceedings, although it will, of course, have repercussions
abroad.... If the participation of a Canadian court or the
Canadian Government is required in order to facilitate extra-
dition so that suspected criminals may be brought to justice in
other countries, it seems to me that we must face up to the
question whether such persons have the benefit of the Charter
or not in the Canadian proceedings.' 35
The better view is that the Charter does apply to extradition
proceedings and can be pleaded. However, this will depend
upon which sections are being invoked. In the case of some
provisions, such as those dealing with delay in section i i(b), it
would be hard to justify their application when the only delay
is that of the foreign authorities.1 36 The object of section 11 (b)
is to deal with delay caused by Canadian authorities. 37 Wil-
son, J. hits the nail on the head when she states in Mellino138
that to seek to apply section ii (b) would interfere with in-
ternational comity; Canadian courts should not demand
from a foreign government reasons for a delay. Her basic rea-
son was that "an assessment of the reasonableness or otherwise
of a delay presupposes the right to demand an explanation for
it. If this right is not there, no assessment can be made. It
cannot be determined whether the foreign delay was reason-
able or not. That delay cannot therefore be considered under s.
1l(b).'"139
This type of analysis is particularly appropriate to the ques-
tions being considered in this article, the central issue of
which is whether sections 12 and 7 of the Charter may be
successfully raised by the fugitive in the death sentence con-
text. One should consider first the overall applicability of the
Charter in general terms to extradition cases and then a sec-
tion-by-section analysis to see if certain sections apply subject
to section 1.
135 Ibid., 532.
136 Note, however, that in Mellino, supra note 128, at 559, La Mer, J. held that in a
preliminary enquiry in Canada s. i i(b) would apply and thus by extension to
extradition.
137 Wilson, J., ibid., 561.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
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3. Section 12 of the Charter
In the Soering case, the European Court, referring to Arti-
cle 3 of the European Convention dealing with inhuman and
degrading treatment, stated that "an individual may not be
surrendered out of the protective zone of the Convention with-
out the certainty that the safeguards which he would enjoy are
as effective as the Convention standard."' 40 The United King-
dom had argued that it could not be responsible for acts occur-
ring outside its territorial jurisdiction regarding Article 3- It
argued in particular that it would strain the language of Arti-
cle 3 in an intolerable fashion to hold that by the surrender of a
fugitive the extraditing/requested state has "subjected" her or
him to any treatment or punishment in the receiving state.
A number of other arguments of comparative interest to
Canada were also presented. Among these of especial note are,
first, that to extend the application of Article 3 to the matters
encompassed in Soering would lead to a conflict with the
norms of international judicial process, in the sense that it
involves in reality adjudication of the internal affairs of states
not parties to the Convention and/or to proceedings before the
institutions of the Council of Europe; second, that it would
entail grave difficulties of evaluation and proof concerning the
system of law of the foreign state and conditions of treatment
and punishment there; and third, that there would be a serious
risk of harm to the contracting state which "is obliged to
harbour the protected person, and leaves criminals untried, at
large and unpunished." 14 1
In Canada all these concerns are applicable, as, even though
the European conventional obligations are not involved, the
Canadian Charter of Rights does give rise to the same issues.
Does its section 1 2 apply directly to an extradition from Can-
ada? The European Court of Human Rights held that "the
Convention does not govern the actions of States not Parties to
it, nor does it purport to be a means of requiring the Contract-
ing States to impose Convention standards in other states.' 42
However, the Court went on to state that "These considera-
140 Supra note 57, para. 82.
141 Ibid., para. 83.
142 Ibid., para. 86(1).
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tions cannot absolve the Contracting Parties from responsibil-
ity under Article 3 for all and any foreseeable consequences of
extradition suffered outside their jurisdiction.' 4 3 Just as the
European Court in Soering held that, in interpreting the
European Convention, "regard must be had to its special char-
acter as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights
and fundamental freedoms,' ' 144 so one can say that the Cana-
dian Charter has the purpose of guaranteeing rights and free-
doms in Canada. Both the Convention and the Charter must
be interpreted and applied so as to make their safeguards both
practical and effective. 145
The European Court held appropriately that it is not nor-
mal for the Convention institutions to pronounce on potential
violations of the Convention. It is different, however, when an
extradition would violate Article 3 by reason of foreseeable
consequences in the foreign state. After all, once the person is
extradited, there is no going back.
The central issue, of course, is whether the potential of or
the carrying out of the death sentence in the foreign state is a
violation of the right not to be subjected to cruel or unusual
treatment or punishment. This is an extremely difficult ques-
tion. In Soering the European Court did not consider whether
the death sentence per se violated this right, but rather viewed
the subjection of the fugitive to the so-called "death-row phe-
nomenon" if returned to the United States and sentenced to
death, to be the applicable question. The Court was of the
view that, under the terms of the Convention, there can be no
exceptions made to Article 3 and that no derogation is permis-
sible in time of war or national emergency under Article 15.146
Thus, Article 3 "enshrines one of the fundamental values of
the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe."'
147
The right set forth in Article 3 is also contained in Article 7 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights148 to
143 Ibid., para. 86(3) (emphasis added). C. Warbrick, "Coherence and the European
Court of Human Rights: The Adjudicative Background to the Soering Case,"
(199o), i i Mich. J. Int'l L. 1073, 1092 takes the view that this is a negative duty,
contingent upon the assessment of the likelihood of damage.
144 Ibid., para. 87, citing Ireland v. United Kingdom (1978), E.C.H.R. Series A, no.
25, at go, s. 239. See also The Netherlands v. Short, supra note 63.
145 Ibid.
146 Supra note 57, para. 88.
147 Ibid.
148 1976 Can. T.S. no. 47. Note also Art. 6(2) re the death sentence. Note also Art. 5 of
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which Canada is a party, in Article 5(2) of the American Con-
vention on Human Rights, 49 and in the United Nations Con-
vention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 50 which Canada ratified
in 1987.
In determining whether the potential punishment is a vio-
lation of this fundamental right, it is necessary to look at each
case on an individual basis. The protections in both the Euro-
pean Convention and the Canadian Charter are aimed at a
balance between the demands of the community interests and
the rights of the individual. It is necessary in identifying the
circumstances of the case to consider whether it is in the inter-
ests of justice to bring the alleged or convicted criminal to
justice by extradition and what would be the ramifications of
not so doing.'5 ' These factors must be taken into account.
Notions of inhuman, cruel, and degrading treatment or pun-
ishment cannot be looked at in a vacuum.
In the Soering case, the European Court concentrated first
on whether Soering would run a real risk of being sentenced
to death if extradited to Virginia. It was only following an
affirmative answer to that question that the Court declared
that the actual source of the inhuman or degrading punish-
ment was the subjection to the "death row phenomenon."
In any discussion of what constitutes cruel or ill treatment
or punishment, there must be a minimum level of severity. In
Soering the Court said the assessment of the minimum was
relative, depending upon all the circumstances of the case,
including the context and nature of the punishment, the
manner and method of its execution, its duration, its physical
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 UNGA Res. 217 (III), UN Doc.
A/81o, at 71.
149 OAS Official Records OEA/Ser. K/XVI/i.I, Doc. 65, Rev. i, CORR. 2, Jan. 7,
1970.
15o Adopted by the UN General Assembly on Dec. 1o, 1984, in force on June 26, 1987.
Canada ratified it on June 24, 1987, and amended the Criminal Code to ensure
compliance: s. 245.4. See Multiculturalism and Citizenship Canada, Outlawing
an Ancient Evil: Torture (1989). Note the "Soering Understanding" placed by the
United States in its ratification indicating that it will not alter U.S. law regarding
the death penalty: see S. Exec. Rep. No. 3o, Ioist Cong. 2d Sess. 36 (199o), jo. See
the statement by the U.S. Legal Advisor Sofaer to the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, discussed in Lillich, supra note 64, at 148.
151 Supra note 57, para. 89.
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or mental effects, and in certain cases the age and mental
health of the person.1 52 Thus, the Court looked at a variety of
factors that, taken together, would constitute cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment. However, it must be under-
stood that capital punishment is not prohibited in either the
European Convention, the International Covenant. on Civil
and Political Rights, or the American Convention on Human
Rights; all permit deprivation of life in execution of a sen-
tence of a court following conviction of a crime providing for
this penalty. 53 This is clearly the reason that Soering did not
argue the violation of Article 3 by the death penalty itself. The
Court was satisfied that, although Article 3 could not be inter-
preted as generally prohibiting the death penalty, 54 it might
well be that subsequent practice in national penal policy could
be understood as establishing the agreement of the states par-
ties to abrogate the exception in Article 2(1) and thus to
remove the limitation on Article 3. Protocol 6 to the European
Convention 155 does just this by providing for the abolition of
the death penalty in time of peace. It came into force in March
1985 and thirteen states, not including the United Kingdom,
have ratified it. Further steps in the same direction have fol-
152 Ibid., para. too. See also Ireland v. The United Kingdom, Ser. A, no. 25. at 65, s.
162, and the Tryrer judgment of Apr. 25, 1978, Ser. A, no. 26, at 14-15, SS. 29 and
30.
153 See Art. 2(1) of the European Convention and Article 6 of the Covenant. See also
Art. 4(2) & (3) of the American Convention. Note, however, that the Human
Rights Committee under the Covenant expressed its opinion that the ultimate
aim of the Covenant was the abolition of the death penalty. See M. J. Bossuyt,
Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee 6n the Prevention of Discrimination
and the Protection of Minorities, "The Administration of Justice and the Human
Rights of Detainees: Elaboration of a Second Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the
Death Penalty," ECOSOC Doc. E/CN. 4 /Sub.2/1 9 87 /2o, June 29, 1987, at 6. For a
detailed account of the death penalty in the world and the issues raised by the
death penalty, see Bossuyt, ibid., and Amnesty International, The Death Penalty
(1987) and When the State Kills (1989). Also see the Report of the Secretary
General of the United Nations on Capital Punishment, ECOSOC Doc. E/1 9 85 /
43, Apr. 23, 1985.
154 This interpretation would nullify Art. 2(l), ibid., and would not therefore be in
keeping with reading the Convention as a whole and the provisions as in har-
mony. See Klass and Others Judgment, Sept. 6, 1978, Ser. A. no. 28, at 31, s. 68.
But note the concurring separate opinion of Judge de Meyer in Soering holding
that the death penalty does violate European human rights law. See the Fidan
case, 1987 Receuil Dalloz Sirez Jurisprudence 305 (Conseil d'etat).
155 E.T.S. No. 114. In the Short case, supra note 63, The Netherlands had ratified
Protocol 6.
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lowed. The United Nations General Assembly by a narrow
vote in December 1989 adopted a Second Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant aimed at abolishing the death pen-
alty except during wartime.156 Canada voted in favour of it.'
However, both Protocol 6 and the Covenant amendment can
only obligate those states that ratify them. They cannot be
interpreted as generally applying to all states.
Thus, the position remains that the death sentence under
the European, International Covenant, and American Conven-
tion systems is not ruled out. This does not mean, however,
that the provisions on cruel and inhuman treatment or pun-
ishment cannot be raised. The keys to this puzzle must lie in
how the sentence is to be imposed or executed, the proportion-
ality of the sentence to the gravity of the crime committed, the
conditions of detention before sentence execution, and so on.
In Soering, the Court's final view was that, based upon the
particular facts of the case, the decision by the United King-
dom to return him to the United States where he would face
the "death-row phenomenon," constituted a violation of Arti-
cle 3.158 In this decision the arguments of Soering that were
persuasive were that delays in appeal and review procedures in
Virginia following a death sentence would expose him to
increasing tension and psychological trauma; that his life and
mental state would not necessarily be taken into account by
the judge or jury in determining sentence; that in the extreme
conditions on "death row" in the particular detention centre
he would be the victim of violence and sexual abuse because of
his age and nationality; and that he would suffer the constant
spectre of the death sentence being carried out. Soering had
also argued that he would not oppose deportation or extradi-
156 UNGA Res. 44/128 of Jan. 30, 199o, annexing the Resolution on the Protocol,
approved Dec. 15, 1989, by a vote of 59 in favour to 26 against with 48 abstentions.
It will come into force when io states ratify it. Reprinted in 29 Int'l Leg. Mat.
1464 (1990). See also the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights
to Abolish the Death Penalty, June 8, 199o, in (1990) 29 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1447.
157 Bossuyt, supra note 153, at 27, where he lists the replies of abolitionist states to
the proposed Optional Second Protocol. Canada is said to have believed in the
merit of the Protocol and "[t]here was no doubt that the United Nations would be
honouring human dignity by enshrining the principle of abolition of the death
penalty in an international instrument": see ibid., paras. 88 and 137.
158 Supra note 57, para. 105. See Lillich, supra note 64, at 141, but also note the views
of Quigley and Shank, "Death Row as a Violation of Human Rights: Is it Illegal
to Extradite to Virginia?" (1989) 30 Va. J. Int'l L. 241, 270.
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tion to the Federal Republic of Germany where the death pen-
alty had been abolished, and that the refusal of the United
Kingdom to do so accentuated the disproportionality of the
Secretary of State's decision. The United Kingdom's view on
this alternative destination had been that it was not material
and, moreover, would lead to a double standard whereby a
fugitive with an alternate destination would have European
Convention protection but others would not.159 The Court
found this argument to have weight. However, it concluded
that sending Soering to Germany would remove the danger of
him going unprosecuted and punished, and also protect him
from the "intense and protracted suffering on death row." 160
On this basis the Court held that the alternative destination
was one factor applicable to the overall fair balance of interests
and to the proportionality of the United Kingdom's contested
extradition decision. 161
For all of these reasons, the unanimous conclusion of the
European Court was that extradition to the United States
would expose Soering to a real risk of treatment that would go
beyond the threshold set in Article 3. The alternative destina-
tion was a consideration that played a vital part in that deci-
sion, since the legitimate purpose of extradition for the
horrible murders with which Soering was charged could be
achieved by other means.
This decision will be instructive to the Supreme Court of
Canada as it deals with the issues that doubtless will be raised
in the extradition reference. At the outset, Soering must be
distinguished from Kindler and Ng in that Canada has no
alternative destination to send them to; there are no other
states claiming legitimate bases of jurisdiction over their
offences and seeking extradition. Canada cannot prosecute
pursuant to section 6(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code since
the offences were committed in toto outside of Canada and do
not fall within any of the extraterritorial bases of jurisdiction
exceptions in the Code. This must weigh heavily in the pro-
159 Para.i io.
16o Ibid.
161 Ibid. Note Short, supra note 63, at 138o, for a discussion of the secondary line of
jurisdiction that The Netherlands had over the alleged murder, again an alterna-
tive to extradition to the U.S., the state with primary jurisdiction under Art. 7 of
the NATO Status of Forces Treaty.
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portionality and reasonableness of the Minister's decision.
Deportation to the United States would also, of course, be
ruled out if it were being used as a disguised form of extradi-
tion. 162
Of the two cases, only Kindler has analysed section 1 2 of the
Charter. Following the Minister of Justice's decision to extra-
dite without seeking assurances on January 17, 1986, Kindler
applied under section 18 of the Federal Court Act 163 to the
Federal Court, Trial Division, to review the decision. The
Trial Division 164 dismissed the application and held, inter
alia, that the question whether the death sentence constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment was not an argument to be
ruled on at that point, even though Rouleau, J. held that it
might find its way before the courts further down the line. The
Appeal Division 65 dealt with two issues which looked at the
scope of section 12 and whether the death penalty per se con-
stitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Mr. Justice Pratte
stated:
I find it impossible to say that the death penalty is, in itself, a cruel
and unusual punishment that is forbidden by section 12 of the Char-
ter.... Section 12. .. limits the freedom of action of Canadian author-
ities but does not govern the actions of foreign countries. In deciding
to surrender a fugitive to a foreign country for trial and punishment
in accordance with its laws for an offence committed there, the Cana-
dian Minister of Justice cannot be said, in my view, to subject the
fugitive to any cruel and unusual punishment or treatment. 66
He went on to provide further that this would be the case even
when the fugitive could be subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment, as there the objectionable punishment would be
imposed by the foreign country and not by Canada. 167
This latter statement seems to be out of harmony with even
La Forest, J.'s views as expressed in Schmidt and Mellino to
162 See Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Soblen, [1963] 2 Q.B. 243
(C.A.); Moore v. Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1968 ] S.C.R. 839;
Kindler v. Flora MacDonald, [1985] F.C. 676 (EC.T.D.).
163 R.S.C. 19 85, c.F 7 .
164 Kindler v. Crosbie, Attorney-General of Canada, [1987] 2 F.C. 145.
165 Kindler v. Crosbie, Minister of Justice, Attorney-General of Canada, [1989] 2 F.C.
492 (F.C.A.).
166 Ibid., 498-99.
167 Ibid., 499.
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the effect that the nature of criminal penalties in the foreign
country may shock the conscience or be unacceptable and be
tied into section 7 of the Charter. Apart from this, Pratte, J.'s
finding that the death sentence is not a violation of Section 12
of the Charter is the important segment with regard to the
previous discussion here. Marceau, J. agreed with Pratte, J. in
denying the appeal and held that "it cannot be said that capi-
tal punishment, however imposed and for whatever crime, is
inevitably cruel and unusual within the meaning of section
12. .... 168 He referred to Miller et al. v. The Queen 169 where
the Supreme Court of Canada held that the death penalty pro-
vision, which had until shortly before been in the Criminal
Code, 170 did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment
contrary to paragraph 2(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights. 171
He cogently capsulized the basic notion to which the phrase
refers as follows:
a punishment may be cruel and unusual, either because the unneces-
sary infliction of pain or degradation it involves makes it inherently
and absolutely so, or else because its disproportion to the gravity of
the crime committed makes it become so. Capital punishment is not
more inherently cruel and unusual today than it was twelve years
ago: there is no more unavoidable infliction of pain involved. And I
do not think that society's standards of decency have evolved in the
interim to the point where capital punishment would not appear
disproportionate to the gravity of any crime, however revolting and
outrageous. 72
Marceau, J. referred to the vote taken in the House of Com-
mons on June 29, 1987, to reinstate the death penalty in Can-
ada, which has been abolished in 1976.173 The vote was 148
against reinstatement to 127 in favour. He did not take this
majority vote to mean, however, that capital punishment is
now seen as "an outrage to the public conscience or as a degra-
dation to human dignity.' 74 His view was that the simple fact
168 Ibid., 500.
169 [1977] 2 S.C.R. 68o.
17o R.S.C. 1970, c. C- 34 .
171 R.S.C. 197o, Appendix III.
172 Supra note 164, 15 500-1. In Smith v. The Queen, (1987), 34 C.C.C. (3 d) 97, 141,
Lamer, J. held that section 12 is only concerned with the effect of a punishment
and the process by which it is imposed is not of great relevance.
173 S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 105, s. 5. The death penalty had not been used since 1962.
174 Supra note 164, at 500-1.
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that the vote was taken attests to the contrary. The majority
vote indicated to him that the view was that the death penalty
was beyond what was necessary to achieve the goals that crimi-
nal punishment seeks in Canada, with a consideration that
possible alternatives existed; also that there was a profound
depth of belief and feeling that retribution instincts should be
controlled and less irreversible means found to protect society
from dangerous criminal offenders. He felt that there was a
gap between these rationalizations which are based on moral
values and beliefs and on an educated evaluation of the collec-
tive good, and "an acknowledgement to be given constitu-
tional entrenchment, that any criminal, whatever his crime,
has a fundamental right not to suffer the death penalty." 175
Both Pratte, J. and Marceau, J. dealt with the death sentence
per se; they did not address the death row phenomenon ques-
tion. 76 The former, however, is the harder issue and was the
one the European Court did not address. Marceau, J. acknowl-
edged that the means by which the sentence is to be carried out
or its disproportionality to the gravity of the crime involved
may render the death sentence in certain cases contrary "to our
notions of decency and therefore in direct conflict with the
prescriptions of the Charter." 177
Hugessen, J., dissenting, took a similar approach to that of
Wilson, J. in Schmidt with regard to the application of the
Charter. He held that extradition involves the application of
Canadian law, treaties forming an integral part thereof. Thus,
the Canadian government and the courts cannot "turn a blind
eye to what is going to happen once the fugitive is surren-
dered." 178 With respect to section 12, he was of the view that
contemporary Canadian society views the death sentence as
unacceptable. 179
175 Ibid.
176 The Privy Council has addressed the matter of delay in executing the death
penalty (unsuccessfully for applicants) in Abbott v. Att. Gen. for Trinidad and
Tobago, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1342, and Riley v. Att. Gen. of Jamaica, [1982]1 W.L.R.
557; 3 All E.R. 46 9. See also D. Pannick, Judicial Review of the Death Penalty C.
4 (1982). The "delay in execution" argument must be read in the light of the fact
that it results from the rights of review of the individual: see Richmond v. Lewis
(9 th Cir. U.S. C.A., Dec. 26, 199o, unreported) and the European Commission's
Report, supra note 93 in Soering.
177 Supra note 164, at 502.
178 Ibid., 5o6.179 Ibid., 5o8.
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It is worthwhile noting that in 1987 the Supreme Court of
Canada in Smith v. The Queen 180 struck down the imposition
in section 5(2) of the Narcotic Control Act18" ' of a seven-year
minimum term of imprisonment for importing narcotics, as
being contrary to section 12 of the Charter. The term was
viewed as qualitatively acceptable but quantitatively grossly
disproportionate. Lamer, J. (as he then was), with whom the
other justices agreed, made it clear that some categories of
punishment are just unacceptable as they will "outrage our
standards of decency." 82 The criteria enunciated by Lamer, J.
may well prelude his analysis of the death penalty/extradition
matter. He there stated that "[T]he determination of whether
the punishment is necessary to achieve a valid penal purpose,
whether it is founded on recognized sentencing principles, and
whether there exist valid alternatives to the punishment
imposed, are all guidelines, which without being determina-
tive in themselves, help to assess whether the punishment is
grossly disproportionate."'' 83
The basis for this type of balancing can be found in the case
of R. v. Miller and Cockriel184 where McIntyre, J.A. held in
dissent in the British Columbia Court of Appeal that it was
not permissible to impose a sentence with no value because it
neither protected society by deterring criminal behaviour nor
served another social purpose. A punishment without these
attributes, in his view, would be cruel and unusual. Although
this case dealt with the death sentence in Canada, its passages
are apposite to the present discussion. In McIntyre, J.'s view,
capital punishment fails to acquire the justification of deter-
rent effect and that "it would be cruel and unusual to impose
the ultimate penalty on the mere chance that it may have a
deterrent effect."
Hugessen, J. in Kindler held that the only penal purpose
being served by the imposition of the death penalty was the
incapacitation of the executed criminal. He found this as
18o (1987), 34 C.C.C. (3 d) 97; [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045.
181 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-i.
182 Supra note 18o, at 1073-74. Referring as examples to corporal punishment,
lobotomization, and castration.
183 Ibid., 1074. See also Bouthillier v. U.S.A., supra note loo.
184 (1975), 63 D.L.R. (3 d) 193 (B.C.C.A.). See also his judgment in R. v. Smith, supra
note 179, in dissent, 103-23.
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unacceptable as the use of punishment practices in some
states, for example, cutting off the hand of a thief. Thus, his
final position was that, as a valid and acceptable alternative is
present (presumably assurances being given), the death sen-
tence has no merit and is grossly disproportionate.
Both McIntyre, J. and Hugessen, J. in their respective cases
were in dissent. In Miller, the Supreme Court of Canada did not
find favour with McIntyre, J.'s view. 185 Rather it affirmed that the
Bill of Rights did not confer new rights and could not have the
effect of abolishing capital punishment. The Court said little
about the actual meaning of cruel and unusual punishment.186
There have been numerous cases in the United States deal-
ing with this issue. In Gregg v. Georgia 87 the United States
Supreme Court held that the death penalty per se did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment contrary to the
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. More
recently in South Carolina v. Gathers8 8 the Supreme Court
held that for the purposes of imposing the death penalty, the
defendant's punishment must be tailored to his or her personal
responsibility and moral guilt.
The Supreme Court of Canada will have to face section 12
head on in the "death sentence reference." Is it directly appli-
cable or can it only be looked at in conjunction with section 7?
If found to be directly applicable, will the Court address the
question whether the death penalty is cruel and unusual per
se, or will it dispose of the case on the basis of whether the
position of the convicted person on death row for an undeter-
mined period of time with all if its psychological and physical
185 [1977] 2 S.C.R. 68o, a pre-abolition case. Laskin, C.J. did conclude that the death
penalty did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment within para. 2(b) of the
Bill of Rights.
186 See Smith, supra note 18o, at 135 (C.C.C.). For a synthesis of the criteria used by a
minority of the judges, see W. Tarnopolsky (as he then was), "Just Desserts or
Cruel and Unusual Treatment or Punishment?: Where Do We Look for Guid-
ance?" (1978) 1o Ottawa L. Rev. 1, 32-33. See also Re Mitchell and The Queen
(1983), 6 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. H.C.) and other cases referred to in Smith, supra
note 179, at 135-37.
187 428 U.S. 156 (1976). Note that 37 states in the United States permit capital pun-
ishment. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) and Stanford v. Kentucky
109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989). Also Bassiouni, Lahey, and Sang, "La Peine de mort aux
Etats-Unis: L'Etat de la question en 1972," (1973) 1 Revue de Science Criminelle
et le Droit Compar6 23.
188 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989).
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ramifications, in and of itself constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment or treatment?
Undoubtedly, it will be argued by the requesting state that
any cruel or unusual treatment or punishment will occur out-
side of Canada, if at all, and therefore that section 12 does not
apply. This argument will go against the grain of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights decision in Soering.
Should section 12 be found to apply directly and be prima
facie violated by future imposition of the death sentence, then
on the basis of Smith v. The Queen it will be on account of
gross disproportionality. 8 9 As has been expounded on many
occasions by the Supreme Court of Canada, in a case of viola-
tion of a Charter right the burden lies upon the authority in
question "to salvage the legislative provision" 190 by showing
that it is justified under section 1 of the Charter. 91 The criteria
set out by Dickson, C.J. in R. v. Oakes 92 must be met to
discharge this burden. The objective must be of sufficient
importance to warrant overriding the Charter right. Clearly
the Supreme Court has recognized this with respect to extradi-
tion in U.S.A. v. Cotroni and El Zein.193 However, the party
invoking section I must then show that there is proportional-
ity between the measures adopted and the objective in ques-
tion; that the means impair "as little as possible" the right of
freedom; and lastly, that there is proportionality between the
effects of the measures and the objective.194
Le Dain, J. and McIntyre, J. in Smith held that once section
12 is prima facie violated, it cannot be saved by section I; this
was also the approach in the dissent of Hugessen, J. in
Kindler. 95 This view of the absolute nature of section 12 is in
error. There is no non-derogation provision in the Charter; the
rights contained in it are not absolute, but are to be evaluated
in the light of section 1.
189 Supra note 18o, at 139 (per Lamer, J.).
19o Ibid., 144.
191 For such an analysis by this writer, see Castel and Williams, supra note 68.
Section i provides: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees
the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits pre-
scribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
192 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 1o3 at 138.
193 [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1469.
194 Supra note 192, at 139.
195 Supra, note 18o, at 149 (Le Dain) and 105-6 (McIntyre).
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If, however, the Supreme Court of Canada in the death sen-
tence reference takes the view that section 12 of the Charter is
not directly applicable, as the treatment and punishment will
occur abroad, that section will be relevant to a determination
of the applicability of section 7. In R. v. Herbert, the Supreme
Court of Canada held that "[T]he scope of a fundamental
principle of justice under s. 7 cannot be defined without refer-
ence to the other rights enunciated in [the portion of the Char-
ter dealing with legal rights.]" 196
4. Section 7 of the Charter
It is clear from the extradition cases decided since the enact-
ment of the Charter that the decision of the Minister of Justice
to surrender the fugitive must conform with section 7 and thus
the principles of fundamental justice. 197 This raises the ques-
tion of the reasonableness of the Minister of Justice's decision
in not asking for assurances or accepting insufficient assur-
ances as to the death penalty. In both the Kindler and Ng
cases, no assurances were asked for. Was this in keeping with
the principles of fundamental justice?
Section 7 in its own terms is not absolute, having qualifying
words. Life, liberty, and security of the person are rights, but
the implication is that they may be derogated from if doing so
is in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
The extradition to a state that retains the death penalty is thus
not automatically ruled out. In assessing whether the princi-
ples of fundamental justice have been complied with by the
Minister of Justice in deciding to extradite without seeking
assurances, the Supreme Court of Canada in the extradition
reference will have to look at three interconnected issues. First,
how is it to be determined that the Minister of Justice acted
fairly and reasonably in exercising his or her discretion to
extradite? Second, if section 12 is prima facie violated, will this
result in a breach of the principles of fundamental justice if
extradition occurs? Third, in such an event, will section i
operate to allow the extradition?
196 [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, 176 (per MacLachlin, J.). See also Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 502 (per Lamer, J.).
197 See, e.g., Schmidt, supra note 9; Mellino, supra note 128; and AUard and
Charette, supra note 111.
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As to the first issue, the Federal Court, Trial Division, in
Kindler held that the decision of the Minister was an adminis-
trative decision involving an exercise of discretion and that
naturally this was subject to the requirements of natural jus-
tice.198 Rouleau, J. agreed with the submissions of counsel for
the Minister that "the object of the Extradition Act is to pro-
vide for the return of fugitive offenders to the country in
which the offence was committed.... The courts have recog-
nized the broad nature of [the Minister's] discretion."' 199
Rouleau, J. adroitly summed up the duty incumbent upon
the Minister to act fairly by referring to Nicholson v. Haldi-
mand-Norfolk Regional Board of Commissioners of Police200
in which the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized that one
of the essential components of the duty to act fairly is the
disclosure of the grounds upon which an adverse decision is
made. He stated that if the decision required the exercise of a
discretion, the reasons given should demonstrate two things:
first, that the decisionmaker recognized that there was a choice
and, second, the factors considered in making the choice.20'
But his conclusion was that balanced against these require-
ments is the practical notion that it would be an unjustifiable
burden to place a requirement of "elaborate and overly-scru-
pulous reasons."20 2 The Minister's decision must fairly and
accurately assess the situation both from the fugitive's perspec-
tive and also from that of the Canadian public interest. In Re
Idziak and Minister of Justice (No. 2),203 Doherty, J. held that
the standard adopted by Rouleau, J. in Kindler was correct and
was met in Idziak, the manner in which the Minister of Justice
reached his decision being in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice.
This discretion of the Minister under Article 6 of the Extra-
dition Treaty with the United States is an administrative dis-
cretion and subject to the control that the judiciary exercises
over the executive;20 4 the Minister of Justice must act lawfully
198 [1987] F.C. 145, 155.
199 Ibid., 156.
200 [1979] 1 S.C.R. 311.
201 Supra note 198, at 154.
202 Ibid.
203 (1989), 53 C.C.C. (3 d) (Ont. H.C.), aff'd (1990), 72 O.R. (2d) 48o (Ont. C.A.).
204 Supra note 198, at 155.
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and fairly. In order to determine this, it is necessary to look at
the Extradition Act and its scope and object.20 5 The Minister's
discretion only arises after the courts have committed the fugi-
tives for the purposes of surrender.206 Rouleau, J. in Kindler
held that "in the absence of a blatant error in law going to
jurisdiction, a court should not review a decision of this nature
on its merits."20 7
Specifically concerning Article 6 he went on to state that
"the decision of the Minister is essentially a policy one and the
determination of whether assurances should be sought from
the United States is a matter wholly within the Minister's dis-
cretion." 208 Furthermore, he stated that the Minister had had
regard to Canadian public interests in that the government
wished to discourage fugitives from seeking refuge in Canada.
This policy decision in his view was not "an error of law." 20 9 It
is worth mentioning at this juncture that this "discourage-
ment" is necessary as Canada employs a basically territorial
approach to criminal jurisdiction over the offence as encapsu-
lated in section 6(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code. Thus,
unless the Code were to be amended to allow for prosecution
in Canada, on other bases than the territorial principle as
interpreted in R. v. Libman,210 Canada would be in an impos-
sible position. Rouleau, J. was satisfied that the fugitive
Kindler had "been availed of all the fairness to which he was
entitled."21' He felt that the Minister had reached a rational
conclusion.
The Federal Court of Appeal also dealt with this same issue.
Pratte, J. held that since the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, 212 the section 7 reference
to the principles of fundamental justice did not apply only to
rules of procedure; thus, a decision that is in accord with all
rules of procedure may still violate the principles of funda-
mental justice. The question is simply put. Is the exercise of
205 Ibid., 156.
2o6 See Re Federal Republic of Germany and Rauca (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 225, 241
(Ont. C.A.).
207 Supra note 198 at 156.
2o8 Ibid., 157.
209 Ibid., 157.
210 [19 85 ]2 S.C.R. 178 (S.C.C.).
211 Ibid.
212 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
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the discretion fundamentally unjust? Pratte, J. referred to the
judgment of La Forest, J. in Schmidt and stated that "a minis-
terial decision to surrender a fugitive to a country where he
could be tortured could be said to be fundamentally unjust
and violate section 7."213 Pratte, J.'s view was that the decision
to extradite Kindler was not fundamentally unjust for the rea-
son that deprivation of the right to life is not in itself contrary
to the principles of fundamental justice, as section 7 expressly
recognizes.
Marceau, J. took the position that the duty to seek assur-
ances under Article 6 of the Treaty could only be turned into a
compulsory duty rather than a discretion if the death sentence
per se was a cruel and unusual punishment within section 12.
He also alluded to the statement of La Forest, J. in Allard and
Charette214 where he discussed the right of the courts to review
the Minister's decision by virtue of their role under the Charter
but warned of exercise of this function with caution, saying
that "Our international obligations are involved here and the
executive obviously has the primary responsibility in this
area." 215 Marceau, J. concluded his judgment by assessing the
impact of the Supreme Court of Canada's trilogy and stated
that he thought that the various statements as to "caution" by
the courts and the "pre-eminent position" of the executive and
so on mean that "for the Court to intervene, it does not suffice
that the situation facing the fugitive in his country would not
be in full accordance with the prescriptions of the Charter....
It would be necessary that the situation 'sufficiently shocks the
conscience' (Schmidt) and be 'simply unacceptable' (Allard)
regardless of the Canadian context." 216 Thus, he too con-
cluded that the Minister will be forced to refuse surrender only
if the punishment or treatment to which the fugitive is likely
to be subjected on return is "inherently and absolutely con-
trary to section 12."216 Otherwise, it is within the assessment
and discretion of the Minister based on the Canadian context
and circumstances of the foreign country.
The big question that the Supreme Court of Canada will be
213 Supra note i18, at 498.
214. Supra note i ii, at 572-73.
215 Ibid.
216 Ibid., 503. Citations omitted.
217 Ibid., 504.
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facing on the death sentence reference is the nature of the
judicial review of the Minister's discretionary power under the
Extradition Act in conjunction with Article 6 of the Treaty.
There are British cases that add some insight into such review.
In Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v. Minister for
the Civil Service,2 18 Lord Diplock classified three grounds
upon which an administrative decision may be impugned:
illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety. 19 Left
open were other grounds of judicial review, the most likely
next on the agenda being proportionality.
"Irrationality" according to Lord Diplock was most suc-
cinctly articulated in Associated Provincial Picture Houses
Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation.2 0 The so-called Wednesbury
principles of reasonableness must be utilized. In extradition
matters, the test would be that a reasonable Minister of Justice
could not have made the order to extradite in such circumstan-
ces. The question may be asked whether the Minister consid-
ered all relevant factors.2 21 In Council of Civil Service Unions,
Lord Diplock stated that "It applies to a decision which is so
outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards
that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the ques-
tion to be decided could have arrived at it. "222
In Bugdaycay v. Secretary of State for the Home Depart-
ment,22 ' an immigration case dealing with a claim to asylum,
Lord Bridge of Harwich did acknowledge the limitations of
the Wednesbury principles, but went on to add that the court
in reviewing an administrative decision must be able to subject
it to the most rigorous examination "to ensure that it is in no
way flawed, according to the gravity of the issue which the
decision determines. '" 2 24 He emphasized that "The most fun-
damental of all human rights is the individual's right to life
and, when an administrative decision under challenge is said
to be one which may put the applicant's life at risk, the basis of
the decision must surely call for the most anxious scrutiny.' 225
218 [1984] 3 All E.R. 935 (H.L.).
219 Ibid., 950-51.
220 [1948] 1 K.B. 223 (C.A.), per Lord Greene, M.R.
221 N. Price, "Human Rights, Death Row and Administrative Law Remedies,"
(1985) 34 Int'l & Comp. L.Q.
222 Supra note 82 at 950-5 1.
223 [1987] 1 All E.R. 84o, 852.
224 Ibid., 952.
225 Ibid. See also Lord Templeman at 956 in the same vein. As to judicial review of
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It is clear that these English cases spell out something that is
quite fundamental to the issue being discussed, that is, that a
fugitive should not be extradited without assurances being
given on the non-application of the death penalty unless the
Minister is able to rationalize his or her decision, based on all
pertinent factors. It seems particularly appropriate that the
inability to extradite Ng and also Kindler to any other aboli-
tionist state and also the inability to prosecute them in Canada
weigh heavily in this determination.
Concerning the second issue, the previous analysis of sec-
tion 12 is pertinent. If section 12 is not directly applicable
because the treatment or punishment will occur abroad, can it
still play a part in assessing the reasonableness of the decision
to extradite and assist in looking at section 7? As was indicated
earlier in assessing whether or not the death penalty is cruel
and unusual treatment or punishment, the Smith2 26 case seems
of great assistance. Is the death sentence grossly disproportion-
ate? Also as was stated by La Forest, J. in Allard,22 7 would the
fugitive face a totally unacceptable situation in the foreign
state or, as he held in Schmidt,228 do the criminal penalties or
procedures in the requesting state sufficiently shock the con-
science so as to result in a violation of section 7? In Re B.C.
Motor Vehicle Act, Lamer, J. held that the Charter rights con-
tained in sections 8 to 14 "address specific deprivations of the
right to life, liberty and security of the person in breach of the
principles of fundamental justice"22 9 and as such are viola-
tions of section 7.
If the death penalty is categorized as punishment in accor-
dance with the law of the requesting state and not necessarily
cruel and unusual, this will be a crucial finding.
It must be recalled that neither the European Convention
nor the International Covenant prohibit the death sentence per
se, but only cruel and unusual punishment. It is only if the
the Australian Attorney General's decision to extradite, see Hempel and Ethe-
ridge v. A.G., [1987] 29 A. Crim. R. 133 (EC.).
226 Supra, note 18o. See also Bouthillier v. U.S.A., supra note ioo, where in obiter
dicta Pinard, J. discusses ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter in relation to the extradition
when there is a mandatory minimum punishment.
227 Supra note i i j, at 572.
228 Supra note 9, at 521
229 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 502.
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two are equated that there is a violation of section 7. The
Supreme Court of Canada has been willing to look to these
international instruments for assistance in interpreting the
Charter.230 Thus the differentiation in the Covenant, to which
Canada is a party, between the prohibition of cruel, inhuman,
and degrading treatment or punishment in Article 7 and the
allowance in Article 6(2) of the death penalty for the most
serious crimes must not be forgotten. As to the Covenant itself,
the United Nations Committee on Human Rights considered
in Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica2 3' whether capital punish-
ment is a violation of section 6(2) and concluded that it did
not. Neither is such a sentence torture within the definition
contained in Article i(i) of the Torture Convention.
CONCLUSION
It is difficult for many people when faced with a convicted
murderer or an alleged murderer, especially where a prima
facie case is readily available, to debate this issue of extradition
or not. But several matters must be faced head on. The Minis-
ter of Justice must exercise his or her discretion under section
25 reasonably. Considerations that will play a part are, inter
alia, from the international co-operation side, the need to
honour Canada's international treaty obligations. From the
Canadian perspective, it must be emphasized that with respect
to Ng and Kindler there is no alternative extradition destina-
tion. Deportation too may prove impossible; certainly, this
would be the case if the fugitive were a Canadian citizen. Fur-
ther, prosecution in Canada is restricted by the territorial
parameters of the Criminal code. The Minister's decision to
surrender must look at the overall Canadian context and the
public interest, as well as the circumstances in the foreign
state.
If the Supreme Court of Canada holds that extradition is not
reasonable in the circumstances of the case if assurances are
230 E.g., Smith, supra note 18o; Slaight Commission Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1
S.C.R. 1038, 1O56-57, per Dickson, C.J. See also W. A. Schabas, International
Human Rights Law and the Canadian Charter (iggi).
231 Communications Nos. 210/1986 and 225/1987 (Apr. 6, 1989) in Report of the
Human Rights Committee, UN General Assembly, Off. Rec: 4 4 th Session, Supp.
No. (A/ 4 4 / 4 o), at 231, para. 215.
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not given, then Canada is faced with two options. The first is
to do what the United Kingdom did in Soering following the
European Court's decision; 232 it got United States agreement
that it would prosecute Soering only on the non-capital
charges, with the result that if found guilty he would face a
maximum penalty of life imprisonment without the possibil-
ity of parole. If the United States does indeed want persons for
the purposes of prosecution this procedure is a possibility and
Canada must indicate this. Second, Canada could amend the
Criminal Code to provide for prosecution in Canada in those
cases of capital murder magnitude where extradition is not
possible. No matter where an individual stands on moral or
religious grounds on the death penalty issue, a solution along
one or other of the following lines would prove acceptable. It
would also be in accord with the maxim aut dedere, aut judi-
care (extradite or prosecute).
A dangerous option to both individual human rights and
state sovereignty remains, namely that of forcibly returning
the fugitive by illegal means outside the extradition process.213
If extradition becomes impossible, will there be an increase in
kidnappings in Canada and forcible returns to the United
States?2 34 It is shortsighted not to envisage these possibilities,
as United States law enforcement officers or private bounty
hunters have not hesitated even in recent times to operate
beyond the orders of their own country, and the United States
232 This compromise was also the approach suggested by The Netherlands Supreme
Court in the Short case, supra note 63. In November 199o, the United States
agreed that the death penalty would not be requested and Short was extradited.
233 See S. A. Williams, "Comment on Unlawful Arrest and Return," (1975) 53 Can.
Bar Rev. 404; F. A. Mann, "Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in
Breach of International Law," in International Law at a Time of Perplexity (ed.
Y. Dinstein, 1989), reprinted in F. A. Mann, Further Studies in International Law
339 (1990); and A. F. Lowenfeld, "U.S. Law Enforcement Abroad: The Constitu-
tion and International Law, Continued," (199o) 84 Am. J. Int'l. L. 444 and
"Kidnapping by Government Order: A Follow Up," (199o ) 84 Am. J. Int'l. L.
712. Note the cases of Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S. Ct. 225 (1886); Frisbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S. Ct. 509 (1952); U.S. V. Toscanino, 500 F. 2d 267
(U.S.C.A. 2d Cir. 1974); U.S. v. Herrera, 504 F. 2d 859 (U.S.C.A. 2d Cir. 1974);
U.S. ex rel Lujan v. Gengler, 51o F. 2d 62 (U.S.C.A. 2d Cir. 1979); U.S. v. Lira,
515 F. 2d 68 (U.S.C.A. 2d Cir. 1975). See also the recent cases of U.S. v. Yunis, 681
F. Supp. 909 (D.D.C. 1988); Matta-Ballesteros ex rel Stolar v. Henman, 697 F.
Supp. 1036 (S.D. Ill. 1988), aff'd 896 F. 2d 255 (7th Cir. 199o), and U.S. v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 856 F. 2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 1O9 S. Ct. 1741 (1989).
234 See C. Van den Wyngaert, "Applying Human Rights to Extradition: Opening
Pandora's Box?," Revue Internationale de Droit PNnal (forthcoming).
168 The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 199o
courts have not relinquished jurisdiction3 5 over the trial of the
cases on account of the manner in which the accused was
brought before them.
235 Based upon U.S. v. Toscanino, supra note 233, this seemed a possibility. How-
ever, initial optimism concerning this case was ill-founded.
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